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Successive U.S. administrations have mired themselves in fruitless attempts to 
arrive at a peaceful conclusion to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Jewish and Islamic 
extremist groups have both been complicit in the delay, complication and derailment of 
peace efforts undertaken by regional moderates and the international community.  
Whatever the ancillary secular motivations of these factions have been, both sides also 
lay claim to profound religious reasons for their opposition to peace. 
Israeli religious Zionist extremists acting on a divine mandate have pressed to 
incorporate all of biblical Israel into their modern state, pursuing settlement activity and 
violence against Arabs and fellow Israelis to achieve this.  Palestinian Islamic extremists 
claim justification from their scriptures for their war against the Jewish state and their 
ultimate goal of seeing it annihilated.  These scriptural dogmas have been reified by 
religious leaders of both faiths, and have been utilized as ideological grounds for violence 
by their respective religious extremist groups. 
This work is an effort to expose the significant religious motivations propelling 
Zionist and Islamic extremist opponents of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process;  seeking 
thereby to raise awareness of the origins of this complex and central dimension of the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM THWARTING PEACE SINCE 1993 
Noted terrorism expert Mark Juergensmeyer told the story of a Hamas suicide 
bomber who, in a video tape made the day prior to his operation, claimed that he was 
“’doing this for Allah.’”1  Juergensmeyer proceeded to characterize this example as 
indicative of a potent philosophy propelling its adherents to “do virtually anything 
if…[they believe it has] been sanctioned by divine mandate or conceived in the mind of 
God,” and which “has surpassed all ordinary claims of political authority and elevated 
religious ideologies to supernatural heights.”2  In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this type 
of commitment to religious doctrine has played a powerful role in motivating religious 
Zionist and Islamic religious extremists.  Extremist groups and individuals of both 
persuasions have successfully delayed, complicated or derailed a succession of attempted 
peace initiatives, beginning with the September 1993 “Declaration of Principles On 
Interim Self-Government Arrangements” (more commonly known and hereafter referred 
to as “Oslo I”),3 signed by the various Israeli governments and Palestinian political 
representatives and backed by the United States and its allies.  In spite of this fact, few if 
any of the peace proposals or public expressions of policy have even so much as made 
mention of the veritable elephant in the room fueling that conflict:  Jewish and Islamic 
religious extremism.  Scriptural doctrines, religious traditions and their human purveyors 
within Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Islamic circles have played weighty roles in 
cultivating the religious extremist movements that have continuously and often violently 
frustrated peace efforts from the earliest days of Zionism, but particularly from Oslo I to 
the present day. 
1. Why Bother With Religion at All? 
“The most intrepid revolutionary is the one who has a fear greater than anything 
his opponents can inflict upon him.”  So wrote Reformation historian Roland Bainton 
                                                 
1 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God:  The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, CA:  University of California Press, 2003), 219. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Jewish Virtual Library, “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements 
(September 13, 1993),” [database online];  available from 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/dop.html;  Internet;  accessed 4 March 2005. 
2 
about the preeminent Protestant reformer Martin Luther.4  This statement is poignant 
regarding the motivational power of religious convictions and beliefs.  For those who 
subscribe to a given religion, even in a moderate sense, their beliefs have opportunity to 
hold sway over every aspect of life—birth, life, marriage, politics, justice, ethics, morals, 
death, eternity, and even seemingly mundane topics such as diet and attire.  Over the 
course of human history, religion has played critical roles in the formation of all levels of 
human relationship, from the family to that of entire empires and civilizations.  Religion 
is a tangible framework connecting humanity with the intangible—something greater 
than itself.  Even for the individual who claims to be non-religious, this very claim and its 
implications may take on the guise of religion, with potential to govern any or all of the 
aspects of the individual’s life which religion might otherwise do. 
Along the nebulous continuum of religious devotion, moving into that realm of 
seriously devoted adherents which grows ever smaller-yet-more-dedicated as one 
approaches the far right margin, religion becomes not only an influencing factor in life, 
but increasingly takes on a foundational role for all of life.  In this arena, which certainly 
varies from individual to individual, sect to sect and religion to religion, the observer 
increasingly encounters people for whom the tenets of scripture, the teachings of holy 
men and women and the mandates of those believed to be deities are absolutely 
inviolable.  For people who hold such beliefs, the mores of society-at-large are often 
valid only so far as they fall in-line with religious dictates.  For some, much of what 
constitutes human society from the noble to the routine is viewed as tainted by 
imperfection and lack of conformity to the ultimate supernatural standard.  It is here that 
one can find some of Luther’s “intrepid revolutionaries;” those for whom censure, 
ostracism and even physical death brought on by the exercise of their convictions not 
only holds no fear, but ought to be accepted and even actively pursued in obedience of 
holy writ and in the quest for eternal recompense. 
Of course, these concepts fly in the face of reality in much of the West.  The 
secularizing effects of democratization, modernity, capitalism and globalization have 
simultaneously created and fed off of Western society’s embrace of moral pluralism.  
                                                 
4 Roland H. Bainton, Here I Stand: A Life of Martin Luther (New York: Meridian, 1995), 104. 
3 
Attempts to claim or to universally impose absolute truth outside of the scientific or 
intimately personal domains can be viewed with skepticism and even hostility.  Along 
these lines, Western thought favors those faiths that are all-inclusive, or at least those 
which have been stripped of their exclusive and absolutist elements.  This may in fact 
create the only ideological structure within which a liberal democracy can properly 
function.  In certain ways, the moral relativism and religious pluralism underscoring 
modern Western (including American) society has become indistinguishable from the 
democratic system being promulgated within (and in some cases forced upon) the 
developing world.  It is no wonder that much of the West stands dumbfounded in the face 
of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  This conflict, for all its contributing storylines 
of political intrigue, war, tyranny of the strong over the weak, economic imbalance and 
natural resource theft, finds religion at its very core—the religion of small but dedicated 
numbers of Jews and Muslims at the extreme fringes of their respective faiths who stand 
in religiously-sanctioned opposition to one another. 
Though he wrote specifically about terrorism, Ralph Peters’ observations about 
religious extremism and his indictment of Western minds on the matter are poignant: 
Those who feel no vital faith cannot comprehend faith's power. A man or 
woman who has never been intoxicated by belief will default to mirror-
imaging when asked to describe terror's roots. He who has never 
experienced a soul-shaking glimpse of the divine inevitably explains 
religion-driven suicide bombers in terms of a lack of economic 
opportunity or social humiliation. But the enemies we face are burning 
with belief, on fire with their vision of an immanent, angry god. Our 
intelligentsia is less equipped to understand such men [and women] than 
our satellites are to find them.5 
This work contends that such religious extremisms have been playing a central role in 
confounding the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.  They have succeeded despite all the 
best efforts of the United States, the international community and the Israeli and 
Palestinian political moderates.  Religious extremist violence has surged since the first 
bilateral attempt at a peace agreement in 1993.  Looking at the scriptural and doctrinal 
bases for Jewish and Islamic religious extremism, the reader will observe that the most 
                                                 
5 Ralph Peters, “The Counterrevolution in Military Affairs: Fashionable Thinking About Defense 
Ignores the Great Threats of Our Time,” Weekly Standard, Vol. 11, Issue 20 (02/06/2006). 
4 
extreme religious opponents of peace draw support from religious diktats hundreds and 
even thousands of years old, themes that more moderate elements of Judaism and Islam 
cannot dispute (except to offer differing interpretations which extremists refuse to accept) 
because they hail from the very canon of Jewish and Islamic scriptures. 
As will be seen here, when contending with Jewish and Islamic extremism in 
Israel and Palestine, the West is not dealing with a demographic that values Western 
notions of civil society, certainly not as a replacement for or competitor with their 
respective religious creeds.  In contrast to many Westerners’ efforts to avoid dissonance 
between comfortable life and religious demands, those who dwell on the extreme fringes 
of religions such as Judaism and Islam will actually embrace internal conflict.  As 
Gershom Gorenberg puts it, “…to believe is to live with dissonance”6—that disconnect 
between belief in a God who is good and a world that is so obviously broken.  Citing 
USC millennialism scholar Stephen O’Leary, Gorenberg also states, however, that the 
conviction of extremists in both of these religions is that God knows creation has been 
ravaged, and has had a plan to put things right all along.7  Where the extreme fringes of 
Judaism and Islam begin to diverge from one another, though, is in their respective 
scriptures’ definitions of which side is in the right and which will burn in hell. 
These are disturbing thoughts on their own merit.  They are especially disturbing 
in the United States of America, where successive governments, the present 
administration included, have employed their prestige and political capital in the (so far) 
vain attempt to bring this crisis to a peaceful, equitable conclusion.  Aside from the 
ideological liabilities facing American society as it attempts to get a grasp on the 
religious sources of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there is the added complication that 
many of America’s best individual minds advising the government on how to resolve (or 
simply manage) this conflict are at a self-admitted loss to understand its religious aspects.  
Noted political scientist Robert Jervis openly admits the inability of many in his field to 
contend adequately with matters of religion.  He wrote in American Foreign Policy in a 
New Era that “terrorism grounded in religion poses special problems for modern social 
                                                 
6 Gershom Gorenberg, End of Days: Fundamentalism and the Struggle for the Temple Mount (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 46. 
7 Ibid. 
5 
science, which has paid little attention to religion, perhaps because most social scientists 
are not religious, shy away from deeply held beliefs, and find this subject unfathomable if 
not embarrassing.”8  Though he was not writing specifically about the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, Jervis nevertheless struck a true note when he said that the roots of religiously 
motivated terrorism run much deeper than what America or the West could hope to solve 
by merely addressing issues of “grinding poverty in the Third World, great and increasing 
inequality within and among nations, corrupt and unresponsive governments, and 
American policies that range the United States alongside the forces of injustice and 
oppression, especially in the Middle East.”9  He surmised that even if the United States or 
its allies were to put right each and every one of these matters, it would still entirely fail 
to satisfy the grievances of those whose lives are “regulated by Muslim clerics who read 
the Koran the way Taliban leaders did.”10  The same principle could be applied to the 
way the United States and the West have tried to redress the dogmatic demands of 
religious Zionist extremists in Israel whose lives are guided by a rabbinate and a 
worldview founded on scriptural bedrock 2,500-3,000 years old.  If Jervis was right, one 
would expect that vigorous efforts to mediate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have bought 
little ground from those on the religious fringes.  Secular remedies have served in many 
cases to draw the religious differences of Jewish and Muslim extremists into even starker 
relief, and to spur these elements to greater effort and sacrifice against peace. 
Before any further pursuit of the discussion of religion and religious extremism, 
whether it pertain to Judaism, Islam or to any other faith, it is essential to note that the 
religions in question are by no means monolithic, nor are the myriad of sects and 
movements that can be traced within their ill-defined boundaries.  Since any religious 
faith has the potential to propel individuals toward extreme action, it is important to avoid 
ascribing such tendencies to all believers within a given faith or sub-group within it.  
Many liberal Jews as well as those not actively practicing Judaism might consider the 
members of Gush Emunim or Kach to be dangerous radicals well outside the confines of 
legitimate Jewish faith.  Their opposite numbers in Gush Emunim or Kach might retort 
                                                 
8 Robert Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era (New York: Routledge, 2005), 37. 
9 Ibid., 42. 
10 Ibid., 43. 
6 
that any Jew who does not practice his or her religion according to traditional precepts is 
no Jew at all.  Similar arguments could be made regarding Muslims, not just along 
sectarian (Sunni, Shi’i or Sufi) lines, but within each sect as well.  Just as a Sunni and 
Shi’i might argue back and forth about whether the other is truly Muslim, a devout, 
practicing Sunni might contend that his or her Sunni brethren in the following of Hamas 
or Islamic Jihad are not following the true path of Islam, either. 
Another crucial point to note before pursuing this argument any further is that the 
debate surrounding religious extremism in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not about 
terrorism—a tactic of “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents”11—despite its 
recurrence within the context of the dispute.  The religious conflict here runs much 
deeper than tactical choices;  it underlies the actions (and inactions) of governments, 
internal party politics, economics, demographics, the religious establishment and its 
fringe movements—embracing and even eclipsing all of them.  Ever since President 
Bush’s speech to Congress nine days after the events of September 11, 2001, much has 
been made of the “war against terrorism”12 currently being fought by the United States 
and its allies against an ill-defined, loosely-connected global diffusion of Islamic 
extremists.  It is en vogue in the United States to conflate and label all such individuals 
and organizations under a single rubric, such as al-Qa’eda, though it is completely 
inaccurate to do so.  In the Israeli-Palestinian milieu, this theme has likewise not gone 
unnoticed.  Former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon did not hesitate to jump on 
America’s “war against terrorism” bandwagon in 2002, tying Israel’s armed struggles 
with Palestinian militants to this larger mêlée in a national address to Israeli citizens.13 
2. Why “Extremism” Instead of “Fundamentalism” or “Radicalism”? 
In the preface to the paperback edition of his book, End of Days, Gershom 
Gorenberg, Israeli newspaper editor, columnist and associate of the Center for Millennial 
Studies at Boston University, makes the following statement about the relationship of the 
                                                 
11 Foreign Relations and Intercourse, U.S. Code,  Vol. 22, sec. 2656f (2000). 
12 Jervis, 46. 
13 “Sharon Declares ‘War Against Terrorism,’” (CNN.com/WORLD, April 2, 2002), [database 
online];  available from http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/03/31/mideast/;  Internet;  accessed 
16 February 2006. 
7 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the Al-Aqsa Intifada (which began in September 2000) and 
the events of September 11, 2001:  “They reveal the power of religious extremism, 
millennial visions and the symbolism of sacred soil to ignite violence. And both are 
linked to the battle to control the Temple Mount, otherwise known as Al-Aqsa.”14  
Gorenberg also says, “it is easy for those who do not share extremists’ beliefs to dismiss 
them as irrational or as a cover for other commitments.  Yet dismissal leaves us deaf to 
the internal logic of people who believe they must shatter the world to make it whole.”15 
In this work, variations on the word “extreme” will be used to refer to the fringe 
elements of both Judaism and Islam, which are often termed “fundamentalist” or 
“radical” in other works.  John Voll chose to use the word “fundamentalist” in his work, 
“Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World,” as he felt it best characterized a broad 
movement within Islam to return to the religion’s original precepts and try to forge a 
modern life according to them.16  In that respect, “fundamentalism” can play a role in 
defining one aspect of our present study, since the religious underpinnings of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, as will be seen, are deeply rooted in the foundational scriptural texts 
of Judaism and Islam.  While the word “radical” on the one hand connotes a branch 
which issues from an origin or a fundamental, it can also signify “a considerable 
departure from the usual or traditional,”17 and can thus be problematic to an analysis that 
places considerable focus on that which is elemental and traditional within Jewish and 
Islamic scriptural doctrines.  For these reasons, “extreme” is a better way to characterize 
the individuals and groups in this study.  It is preferable because it sidesteps questions of 
what is orthodox and what is not, and instead draws attention to the extent or limit to 
which adherents are willing to go in practice because of their religious beliefs.  This work 
will highlight those core values and texts of Jewish and Islamic scripture that divide 
religious extremist elements of both the Israeli and Palestinian societies from their 
mainstream brethren. 
                                                 
14 Gorenberg, v. 
15 Ibid. 
16 John O. Voll, “Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World: Egypt and the Sudan,” Fundamentalisms 
Observed, Vol. 1, eds. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1991): 347. 
17 Merriam Webster Collegiate Dictionary, Encyclopædia Britannica 2004 Ultimate Reference Suite 
DVD, s.v. “radical” [DVD-ROM] (2004). 
8 
3. A Word About Transliteration of Arabic and Hebrew Words, Names, 
Terminology, Etc. 
This work, focusing as it does on aspects of Jewish and Islamic history, scripture 
and current events, contains frequent translations and transliterations of Hebrew and 
Arabic words.  Both languages are Semitic in origin, and as such are based upon simple 
and complex developments of basic tri-consonant root words.  Even though both 
alphabets contain letters that can be utilized to approximate English language vowels, the 
preponderance of vowel sounds are indicated through the use of diacritical markings on 
consonants.  With respect to the consonants themselves, both Hebrew and Arabic contain 
multiple letters indicating varying pronunciations of consonants for which there exists 
only one letter in English.  Additionally, certain consonant sounds in these Semitic 
languages are not found at all in English and vice versa.  All of these factors conspire to 
make it difficult to arrive at a uniform system for transliteration.  In the case of 
translation, as is frequently seen, it can be quite difficult to render certain phrases or 
idioms in one language word-for-word into another. 
The author is an Arabic linguist, and thus where possible, has transliterated 
Arabic phrases into English in such a way that enables the reader to pronounce them 
aloud in a manner which approximates the original language.  Where there is a need for 
translation, the author has endeavored to present the reader with a contextually accurate 
translation, although there may be other meanings for the given word or phrase.  In the 
case of Hebrew words and phrases, the author has chosen to borrow the transliterations 
and translations used across a preponderance of sources.  Where no such majority usage 
has occurred among multiple sources, the author has selected one meaning or 
transliteration and used it uniformly.  In all cases, translations of Hebrew and Arabic 
words will be indicated parenthetically immediately following the word in question.  For 
example:  Jihad (“struggle” or “holy war”).  Similarly, all transliterated Hebrew and 
Arabic words will be rendered in italics, with the exception of certain proper names.  
Thus, terms such as Jihad and certain less-common place names like Haram al-Sharif 
would be italicized, whereas a man’s name such as Fathi al-Shiqaqi would not be. 
9 
B. ORGANIZATION OF ARGUMENT 
This work utilizes historical method to address the topic of religious extremism in 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Using this methodology, the four body chapters and the 
overall thesis are essentially structured to answer three questions:  “What is the 
problem?”, “How do we know?” and “Why does it matter?” 
The thesis is organized to address the problems of Israeli religious Zionist 
extremism and Palestinian Islamic extremism in-turn.  Chapter II looks at the scriptural 
and leadership bases for religious Zionism in Israel, revealing that there are very ancient, 
deeply-rooted doctrinal foundations for religious Zionists’ commitments to their divinely-
appointed racial preeminence, to the entire land of Israel and therefore to rejection of any 
concessions to their Arab neighbors.  Not only do the scriptural texts exist to support 
these beliefs, but charismatic leadership has arisen over the last century which has drawn 
them out of holy writ and has used them to galvanize an educated, sold-out cadre of 
believers committed to their realization, and thus to uncompromising opposition to 
equitable peace with the Palestinians.  Chapter III considers the principal Jewish 
organizations which have put flesh and blood on the religious Zionist belief system and 
have put it to action over the last three to four decades, culminating in the problematic 
issues faced by would-be peacemakers in the period since the signing of Oslo I in 1993. 
Mirroring the structure of the previous chapters on religious Zionist extremism, 
the next two chapters switch sides to address the matter of Palestinian Islamic extremism 
and the role it has played in perpetuating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Chapter IV 
opens the Islamic scriptures in search of tenets that provide Islamic extremists with due 
cause to unequivocally oppose the existence of the state of Israel, and then presents the 
handful of religious ideologues that have rendered these tenets in the modern idiom of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Proceeding out of this discussion, Chapter V details the 
principal Palestinian Islamic extremist groups that have been constructed over the last 
three decades to put Islamic extremist dogmas into practice, particularly in the post-Oslo 
I era. 
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Chapter VI provides a brief summary of the ground that has been covered, closing 
with some propositions regarding the salience of religious extremism to the continuance 

























II. ISRAELI RELIGIOUS ZIONIST EXTREMISM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
How has religion played a guiding and sustaining role for Jewish extremists in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict?  What is it within Judaism that could provide sufficient 
incentive to radicalize individual Jews against the prospect of peace between Israelis and 
Palestinians?  Are there canonical, scripturally-based religious doctrines that predispose 
religious extremists to violently oppose an equitable resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict?  If such doctrines exist, who has interpreted and propagated them for the 
believers, and which extremist groups have followed their lead?  To address these 
questions, we will first consider a brief background of the historical role religion has 
played in the Zionist movement leading up to the time period in question.  Having done 
this, we will then look at the Jewish scriptures in search of teachings and themes that 
might be applied to the conflict.  From there we will follow with an examination of the 
principal religious authorities which have undertaken to interpret scripture on the subject 
for their respective religions.  Through consideration of these topics, the reader will find 
that many religious Zionists (Jewish extremists) hold to religious dictates which they 
interpret as leaving leave no room for compromise with the Palestinians over the land of 
Israel. 
The answer to this scriptural-basis question for regarding religious Zionist 
Extremist organizations subscribing to scriptural doctrines have played a very effective, 
increasing role in creating complexities, roadblocks and even acts of violence that have 
stymied efforts to implement any peace agreement.  The hearts of those most dedicated to 
seeing the conflict persist ad infinitum are motivated by a loyalty that trumps all others 
and by narratives that no human authority can alter. 
Judaism is the oldest of the world’s three major monotheistic religions.  It was 
founded, as will be seen, upon a promise and command that God made to the patriarch 
Abraham more than 3,500 years ago.  The command required ethnic and religious purity, 
while the promise included the guarantee of land to Abraham and his descendants—
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“from the river of Egypt to the great river, the river Euphrates,”18 (modern-day Israel, 
occupied Palestine, and parts of present-day Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and the Lebanon).  
God also pledged permanent divine blessing upon Abraham, his progeny and the whole 
world through them.  Judaism’s foundational precepts are contained in the rich scriptural 
texts of the Torah, Nevi’im and Kethuvim (collectively known by their acronym, Tanakh, 
or variously as the Jewish Bible, etc), the same collection of books that form the 
Christian Old Testament.  These are expounded upon in canonical rabbinical traditions 
maintained in the Talmud, as well as other minor writings.  While it would be a 
monumental undertaking to encapsulate the entirety of this long scriptural tradition (the 
author makes no pretense of doing so) in a single work, certain aspects of it will be 
considered here for their very real influence upon the present-day Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, particularly as it involves religious Zionist Jews in Israel and the Occupied 
Territories.  God’s naming of the Jews as His chosen people, His promise of the land to 
Abraham and His requirement of religious purity collectively inspire some religious 
Zionists to take extreme measures that have undermined efforts to forge lasting peace 
between Israel and the Palestinians, and have cost the land, livelihoods and even lives of 
thousands of Palestinian Arabs. 
B. ROOTS OF ISRAELI RELIGIOUS ZIONIST EXTREMISM 
Before examining the scriptural bases of religious Zionist extremism, it is 
necessary to first consider the historical origins of the Zionist movement as a whole, both 
in its secular-political and religious vestments.  Historian James Gelvin wrote that 
Zionism was initially a movement pressing world governments for a political abode for 
Jews.  He chronicled the life and work of Theodor Herzl, the founding father of the 
World Zionist Organization and the impetus behind the surge of political Zionism in turn-
of-the-(twentieth)-century Europe.  As a result of the Dreyfuss Affair, which occurred in 
one of the most liberal European countries (France), Herzl became convinced that Jews 
could not be truly safe without their own state.  His ideas led to what eventually became a 
widely-accepted notion that this state should be planted in Judaism’s ancient Middle 
Eastern abode.  By the early decades of the twentieth century, the socio-economic and 
settlement activities of the members of the aliyot (waves of immigrating Jews) had 
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already resulted in establishment of strong communal institutions and the revival of the 
use of Hebrew in Ottoman Palestine.  Ultimately, the goals of political Zionism were 
twofold:  the allocation of land somewhere on earth for a specifically and separately 
Jewish polity;  and, the far-preferred hope that this land would in fact be Palestine.19 
Early Zionist writings, like those of U.S. Justice Louis Brandeis, have a decidedly 
non-religious feel to them.  He called on American Jews to support their brothers and 
sisters forging a new home in Palestine and lauded those who took the dreams of 
centuries and began to forge them into reality.  Rather than lamenting or condemning life 
in the Diaspora, Brandeis instead lionized the opportunity of those Jews around the world 
to be part of the historic Zionist effort.20  In all of it, Brandeis made no distinguishing 
comment about a Jew’s religious inclinations or those of the Yishuv (Jews already living 
in Palestine). 
On the opposite end of the spectrum from the political Zionists like Herzl and 
Brandeis were those adherents of Judaism who felt (and feel) that the return to Palestine 
was not something to be pursued as a practical, worldly endeavor.  As noted by Jacob 
Klatzkin, such individuals regarded Zionism as a spiritual outlook rather than as a 
political program, and “cited the [Diaspora] as evidence that the basis for our life is the 
eternal content of Judaism.”21  These people characterized return to the land as 
unnecessary.  Some argued that scripture intended such a return to be the result of Divine 
intervention rather than human effort. 
Samuel Heilman and Menachem Friedman, writing for the Fundamentalism 
Project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, laid a useful historical 
framework for differentiating between various sects of Judaism.  Tracing the legacy of 
European Jewry back to the years before the Second World War, Heilman and Friedman 
established three broad categories into which European Jews divided themselves on the 
issue of the practice of their religion:  “assimilated,” “acculturated” and “contra-
                                                 
19 James L. Gelvin, The Modern Middle East: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
218-19. 
20 Louis D. Brandeis, “The Jewish Problem and How to Solve It,” The Zionist Idea: A Historical 
Analysis and Reader, ed. Arthur Hertzberg (New York:  Harper Torchbooks, 1959):  520. 
21 Jacob Klatzkin, “Boundaries,” The Zionist Idea: A Historical Analysis and Reader, ed. Arthur 
Hertzberg (New York:  Harper Torchbooks, 1959):  319. 
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acculturated.”22  The first group essentially bought the secularism of their host cultures 
and societies wholesale, and for all practical purposes “ceased to be Jews.”23  In contrast, 
“acculturated” Jews (Maskilim, meaning “enlightened”) chose a middle road 
“[embracing] the opportunities of emancipation without necessarily abandoning their 
attachments to Judaism and Jewish life.”24  The Maskilim essentially lived in two worlds, 
learning the language and engaging in the commerce and culture of their host nations, 
and yet observing the dictates of Judaism in the home.  Maskilim could write about the 
modern world and culture in Hebrew—not just reserving that ancient tongue for religious 
purposes—and were the strain of Judaism that could easily conceive of a Jewish enclave 
within the family of nations.  In this respect, they were “religious Zionists, who believed 
they could be citizens like everyone else but in a distinctively Jewish modern state, 
without having to meaningfully compromise their fidelity to Orthodox Judaism.”25  
Finally, there were those of the contra-acculturation camp, referred to as the “Haredim,” 
a phrase taken from the prophetic book of Isaiah, describing those who “’tremble…at His 
[God’s] word.’”  These Jews considered themselves the true Orthodoxy, resisting all 
external attempts at forcing them to assimilate with their host culture, and engaging in 
“gatekeeping” in order to keep the “insiders in.”26  The Haredim made use of yeshivot 
(plural of “yeshiva”—a Jewish religious school) to sequester their young males and bring 
them up according to the strict requirements of their sect.  As Zionism waxed popular, the 
Maskilim and Haredim found themselves increasingly at odds with one another. The 
ultra-conservative Haredim viewed “people like the maskil Moses Mendelssohn and 
chief rabbi Abraham I. Kook of Palestine, or most of the leaders of religious Zionist 
parties…as anti-heroes…[whose] failure to struggle against the eroding effects of 
contemporary culture was the greatest sin.”27 
                                                 
22 Samuel C. Heilman and Menachem Friedman, “Religious Fundamentalism and Religious Jews: The 
Case of the Haredim,” Fundamentalisms Observed, Vol. 1, eds. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby 
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23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 219. 
26 Ibid., 205. 
27 Ibid., 219. 
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There were also divisions among those Jews already living in Palestine at this 
time.  There were a number of Orthodox Jews, the “Old Yishuv,” already living in 
Palestine and practicing their religion there prior to the mass influx of exiles from the 
Diaspora in the early 1900s.  These did not seek a separate Jewish state, and were 
definitely not Zionists.28  The “New Yishuv,” or Zionists, were by contrast 
(predominantly) secular Jews, who started arriving in Palestine in increasing numbers 
(very quickly outnumbering the Old Yishuv) after the 1917 Balfour Declaration.  Perhaps 
the most important distinction between the two lay in the fact that the Old Yishuv were 
waiting “for Heaven to take the first step in bringing about redemption, [while] the 
Zionists were going to redeem the land themselves through their own efforts.”29  As the 
Old Yishuv were joined in Palestine by increasing numbers of the haredi Ashkenazim 
(European ultra-Orthodox Jews), the collective bloc of them labored (unsuccessfully) to 
oppose the Zionists’ efforts to create a Jewish nation in Palestine.  For the Old Yishuv as 
well as for the newly-arriving Haredim, preservation of Judaism lay in commitment to 
Torah and tradition, not in conquest of the Holy Land.  They were rapidly eclipsed, 
though not eliminated, by the Zionists after Israeli independence in 1948.30  The political 
interests of the Haredim in Israel eventually came to be represented by the Agudat Israel 
party in opposition to the larger Labor and Likud parties, both of which, despite their 
differences, shared a common devotion to Zionism as a political program oriented toward 
the creation of a sovereign state.31 
Between the secular Zionists and the Haredim lie the religious Zionists.  They do 
not dispute the efforts and accomplishments of political Zionists, but amplify their 
political commitment by incorporating within it those elements of Jewish history and 
scripture that (in their minds) compel Jews to see a return to their ancient homeland.  
Yehiel Pines was of this ilk.  He likened the divorce of religion from Zionism “to 
[depriving] a living body of its soul in order to revive it by an electric shock, which may 
                                                 
28 Heilman and Friedman, 223. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 224. 
31 Ibid., 224-227. 
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have value in resuscitation, but is no substitute for real vitality.”32  In the marriage of race 
and religion, the Jews are unique in the world, said Pines—particularly because the 
institutions of Judaism have followed and sustained the Jews from ancient Israel 
throughout their Diaspora.  He claimed, as secular Zionists did, that land and language 
were the fundamental criteria for nationhood—but added that religion cannot be 
disaggregated from them.  In Pines’ belief, even seemingly secular fields like science and 
education were means for Jews to better understand the Almighty.  As such, nothing 
undertaken by Jews in their Zionist pursuits could reasonably be counted independent of 
Judaism.33 
To further the cause of religion among the Zionists, some argued that religion, 
while being the best foundation for Zionism, was also not going to last forever in 
Diaspora.  In its state of Diaspora, the nation was wasting away, and could not survive 
forever, wrote Klatzkin;  the great bastion of Judaism, its religion, was incapable of 
safeguarding Judaism and preventing Jews from “assimilating” and ceasing any kind of 
meaningful Jewish existence outside the land.34  Moses Hess summed up the position by 
contending that Jews had to rise to reclaim Judaism’s greatest hope, “the restoration of 
the Jewish nation.”35 
Religious and secular Zionists shared a common conception of a Jewish state as 
one in which Jews constitute a permanent, controlling majority.  To accept any other 
possibility would have been to relegate Jews once again to the unprotected position of 
being beholden to another people.  For religious Zionists in particular, the possibility that 
the Jews, having returned to their home in Palestine after a two-thousand-year hiatus, 
might be supplanted and cowed by late-coming Muslims is unthinkable. 
Gershom Gorenberg, an Israeli Jewish journalist who immigrated to Israel from 
the United States in 1977, observed the following upon his arrival there: 
                                                 
32 Yehiel M. Pines, “Jewish Nationalism Cannot Be Secular,” The Zionist Idea: A Historical Analysis 
and Reader, ed. Arthur Hertzberg (New York:  Harper Torchbooks, 1959):  411. 
33 Ibid., 411-12. 
34 Klatzkin, 320-22. 
35 Moses Hess, “Rome and Jerusalem,” The Zionist Idea: A Historical Analysis and Reader, ed. Arthur 
Hertzberg (New York:  Harper Torchbooks, 1959): 123. 
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ultra-nationalist Orthodox settlers of the West Bank…were changing the 
map of the occupied territories [sic], but they were also imposing a new 
map on Jerusalem.  The settlers’ ideology was messianism:  The creation 
of Israel fulfilled prophecy, and the conquest of the West Bank was 
another step toward final redemption.  They claimed to know God’s 
program for history, and their place in it.  For the most extreme, that 
hubris freed them of all moral constraints…36 
This concept, messianism, which will be discussed further, is central to the faith 
of many religious Zionists as it “refers to the expectation of a righteous king, descended 
from David, who will both restore the Jews’ fortune and bring an era of peace for the 
entire world.”37  There is both considerable power and unpredictability in messianic faith.  
It “leads to conspiratorial thinking …[and] interprets the actions of real people…as fitting 
that of characters in the story.  It constantly needs rewriting, as life fails to fit the 
believer’s detective work about what happens next.”38  Its greatest power is its expression 
of “what most of all makes us human—the determination to find meaning and order in 
what appears disparate and disconnected.”39  Its most dangerous form in the case of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is “’catastrophic millennialism’”—a form of messianism 
wherein “the worse things get, the better they really are, and disaster will destroy the old 
order to make room for the new.  Human beings stand by and watch—unless, in another 
variation, they should hurry the cleansing catastrophe along.”40 
Secular Zionism, with its non-religious aspirations nevertheless played “the 
sorcerer’s apprentice, [appropriating] the apparently extinguished symbols of faith, only 
to see them burst back into flames in his hands” over the issues of Jerusalem and the 
Temple Mount.41  These flames waxed intense concurrent with the surge in Jewish 
settlement activity in the Occupied Territories following the 1967 War, and more still 
with the ascendance of the right-wing Likud party in Israeli politics during the 1970s and 
80s.  Through the 1990s and into the new millennium, the stakes rose considerably for 
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Jewish religious extremists as Israeli and Palestinian moderates came successively closer 
to dismantling victories which the extremists had been fighting to consolidate. 
C.   SCRIPTURAL FOUNDATIONS & TEACHINGS OF EXTREMIST 
RABBIS 
The dictates of scripture and teachings of Jewish rabbis (religious scholars and 
teachers) interpreting those scriptures are of first importance for developing an 
understanding of religious Zionist extremism as these two pillars form the principal basis 
from which most religious Jews, Zionist extremists in particular, derive their 
understanding of what is expected of them by God.  Drawing from these canonical, 
broadly accepted sources, certain Jewish rabbis and their flocks have built the foundation 
of the religious Zionism seen today in settlements in the Occupied Territories (OT), in the 
violent actions of various individual extremists (against Arabs and fellow Jews), in the 
platforms of extremist groups and even in some of the policies taken by the Israeli 
government.  Of course, one should not expect to find specific reference to Muslims in 
the Jewish scriptures, whose canonization occurred 700 years before the birth of 
Muhammad.42  As will be shown in the case of the Gush Emunim, this very fact plays an 
interesting role in the doctrine of religious Zionism. The Arabs (be they Muslim or 
Christian) are not really of primary importance—in the push for the whole land of Israel 
and the Third Temple, any adversary would be pushed to the side.  We will first look at 
Jewish scriptures and what these give to religious Zionist extremists.  After this, we will 
focus our attention on the particular rabbis who have played central roles in interpreting 
these texts, teaching from them and motivating their fellow Jews to follow them.  At the 
conclusion of this section, it will be evident that present-day religious Zionist extremists 
have in the scriptures and in these Zionist rabbis a bedrock of support for their beliefs and 
actions to keep the Israeli-Palestinian conflict alive. 
1. Jewish Scriptures 
The Torah and Talmud are full of teachings that are appropriated by religious 
Zionist extremists for their present-day interests.  The scriptural doctrines can be loosely  
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organized under three broad themes:  the Jews as God’s chosen people, the land of Israel 
as God’s divine endowment to Jews, and God’s promise of eternal redemption to the 
Jews. 
In the first category, the doctrine of the Jews as God’s chosen people hails from 
God’s promise to the patriarch Abraham in the book of Genesis.  Abraham’s family 
hailed from Ur of the Chaldeans (in modern Iraq), but migrated during his lifetime to 
Haran (in the border region of modern Turkey and Syria).  While there, God commanded 
Abraham to leave Haran and go to a place God would show him.  There, God said, “’I 
will make of you a great nation, and I will bless you.’”43  When Abraham arrived in 
Canaan (modern Israel and Palestine), God told him, “’I will assign this land to your 
offspring.’”44  This promise was reiterated in Genesis 13 along with the divine guarantee 
“’I will give all the land that you see to you and your offspring forever.’”45  One of the 
first disputes between Jews and Muslims finds its roots during this period surrounding 
who was Abraham’s true heir:  Isaac or Ishmael.  Ishmael was actually Abraham’s 
firstborn, though by a servant in his household, not by Abraham’s wife, Sarah.  However, 
according to the Torah, Isaac, the second son of Abraham but the only son of his union 
with Sarah, was to be Abraham’s heir, not Ishmael.46  Arab Muslims consider themselves 
the descendants of Abraham through Ishmael, and the Jews trace their descent from the 
patriarch through Isaac.  Being God’s chosen people meant that Jews were required to set 
themselves apart from their neighbors through a complex system of religious observances 
and legal ordnances given to the patriarchs Abraham and Moses.47  These dictates, if 
observed to the letter, encompassed almost every aspect of everyday Jewish life, and are 
contained in the Torah and the traditions of the Jews passed down over the millennia.  
These religious directives also included specifications for the sole acceptable house of 
worship, the Tabernacle, a portable, tent-like structure used for worship by the Jewish 
nation since their years in the wilderness following their escape from slavery in Egypt.  
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The Tabernacle was replaced by a permanent structure, the Temple in Jerusalem, built by 
King Solomon, the last ruler of the united kingdom of Israel before its subjugation by 
surrounding empires.48 
The significance of the Temple is its historical centrality to the proper worship of 
God.  According to Mosaic Law (a legal code for the Jewish nation given to Moses by 
God during their wilderness sojourn) as contained in the Torah, absolute purity and 
perfection were required of the Jews by God.  Mosaic Law presupposed that God’s 
people would be unable to attain or maintain such a standard, and accordingly set up an 
elaborate system of rituals designed to make restitution for wrong-doing and thereby to 
restore the purity of individual and nation before God.  Central to this system were ritual 
sacrifices of ceremonially clean animals, presided over by members of the Jewish priestly 
tribe of Levi on an altar in the Tabernacle.   When the functions of the Tabernacle were 
relocated and, in effect, centralized in Solomon’s Temple, the Temple Mount in 
Jerusalem became the sole nexus of the religious practice of Judaism, and thus of the 
nation of Israel and the Jewish people.  Though the sacrificial system was suspended at 
various points in Jewish national history because of foreign invasion and exile, 
subsequent periods of national repentance and return from exile were followed by 
restoration of Temple sacrifices and thus recovery of the ritual purity required by God.  
The First Temple, also known as Solomon’s Temple, was destroyed in 586 BC.49  The 
Second Temple, or Herod’s Temple, was destroyed by the Roman Emperor Titus in 70 
A.D., halting permanently the Jewish sacrificial system, the focal point of ancient 
Judaism.50  No Jewish house of worship has existed on the site since. 
The matter of the Temple is complicated because the site is currently occupied by 
a religious centerpiece of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict:  the Haram al-Sharif, containing 
the Islamic shrines of the Dome of the Rock, Al-Aqsa Mosque (al-Masjid al-Aqsa, “the 
furthest mosque”) and the Dome of the Spirits.51  The Haram al-Sharif is the third holiest 
shrine in all of Islam next to the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia, 
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and the ruins of the First and Second Temples lie somewhere underneath it.  There is an 
expectation among many religious Zionists that a Third Temple will be built (though 
there is disagreement about whether this ought to happen before or after the messiah’s 
return, and about whether restoration of the Temple would require the destruction of the 
Haram al-Sharif);  that the long-dormant sacrificial system will be renewed;  and that the 
proper practice of Judaism will be possible again for the first time in two millennia.  As 
Gershom Gorenberg wrote, “for a small but growing group of Jews on the Israeli 
religious right, every day since 1967 has been a missed opportunity to begin building the 
Third Temple… The Temple Mount is potentially a detonator of full-scale war, and a few 
people trying to rush the End could set it off.”52 
The second category of scriptural doctrine pertains to the land of Israel itself, 
promised to Jews by God through Abraham.  Even though they did successfully conquer 
the Promised Land and rule there for centuries, Jewish national life in the land of Israel 
was eventually interrupted by long periods of exile.  Jewish prophets constantly foretold 
the return of the Jewish Diaspora to Israel from its various places of exile.  The prophet 
Isaiah, who lived during the reigns of Uzziah, Jotham, Ahaz and Hezekiah, kings of 
Judah during the 8th century B.C., told not only of a return of Jewish exiles but also of a 
permanent, eternal state of peace and prosperity for Jews in the city of Jerusalem and in 
Israel at-large. Such scriptures laid the foundation for Jewish expectations not only for 
national political restoration, but also for a messianic, apocalyptic future where Israel 
would be restored to her proper place in servitude of God and in unending security.53  
The prophet Jeremiah, who lived in Jerusalem in the waning days of Zedekiah, the last 
king of Judah before Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, laid the city and the kingdom of 
Judah to waste, prophesied that the Jews of both Israel and Judah would one day return to 
their native land from exile.54  The prophet Zechariah, living in Babylon among his 
fellow exiled Jews from Judah under the rule of the Persian king Darius in the 6th century 
B.C., also foretold a return of exiles to Israel.  The first two chapters of Zechariah detail 
his vision of God’s plan to return the Jewish exiles to Jerusalem and its surrounding 
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Judean environs.55  In the eighth chapter Zechariah wrote, “Thus said the LORD of hosts: 
I will rescue My people from the lands of the east and from the lands of the west, and I 
will bring them home to dwell in Jerusalem.  They shall be My people, and I will be their 
God—in truth and sincerity.”56 
According to some religious Zionists, the land of Israel was incomplete when the 
state of Israel was declared in 1948 because Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria (the Occupied 
Territories) were still in Arab hands.  However, after the Six Day War in 1967, when the 
Israeli Defense Force (IDF) took these regions, to include the Temple Mount in 
Jerusalem, from the Arabs, it seemed that the stage was set for the ultimate fulfillment of 
prophecy.  As Gershom Gorenberg wrote, “for those inclined to hear them, [1948 and 
1967 were] divine proclamations that the hour [was] near…the venue for the events [was] 
Jerusalem—and at its center, the Temple Mount.”57  For some, these conquests embodied 
the realization of “the messianic dream [which had persisted] in its pristine purity for a 
hundred generations.”58  Completely established in the now fully-redeemed, sovereign 
land of Israel, the nation could become, as God had intended, “a source of blessing for all 
nations,” bringing on the time foretold by the prophet Isaiah when “’the land shall be 
filled with devotion to the Lord as water covers the sea’ (Isa. 11:9).’”59 
The final realm of scriptural doctrine appropriated by modern Jewish religious 
extremists regards the messiah (a title taken from the Hebrew word meaning “anointed”) 
and the millennium (sometimes referred to as the End of Days).  This messianism, as 
previously mentioned, centers around the redeemer promised by God who would one day 
purge Israel of her shortcomings, restore her national preeminence over other nations and 
usher in a glorious millennial kingdom.  The prophet Isaiah spoke of him as one who 
would bring “peace without limit upon David’s throne and kingdom” for eternity.60  In 
the book of Daniel the angel Gabriel tells Daniel of a messiah who is to come and rule for 
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a time in a rebuilt Jerusalem.61  The doctrine of the messiah is perhaps the most nebulous 
of the three domains discussed here, as the number of texts interpreted to insinuate things 
about him is significantly greater than the number of those which actually speak of him 
directly.  Despite the imprecision of these prophecies about the advent of messiah, a very 
dedicated, though not monolithic, pocket of present-day religious Zionist extremists 
hangs a great weight upon them, expecting his imminent arrival.  For some religious 
Zionist extremists, the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 was both a fulfillment 
of these ancient prophecies and a precursor to the coming of messiah. 
Amongst all the scriptural passages enjoining return to and occupation of the land 
of Israel aside, it cannot be ignored, as has already been detailed in the case of the 
Haredim, that there has also been a centuries-long rabbinical tradition opposed to aliyah 
(Hebrew for “return”) to Israel.  The Talmudic proscriptions against aliyah issue from a 
couple of Torah passages found in the Song of Solomon and Zechariah, as well as their 
associated rabbinic traditions.    Aviezer Ravitzky cites three oaths imposed by God on 
Israel, two of which were directly applied by rabbis during the centuries of exile (since 70 
AD) who were opposed to the idea of an aliyah to Zion.  These were:  that Jews should 
“not ascend the wall,” and that they should not “rebel against the nations of the world.”62  
These religious scholars used scriptures about suffering for the sake of the Lord, 
enjoining Jews to believe that the glory of God had departed Zion and resided with them 
in exile.63  They argued further, as will be seen in the case of the Haredim, that any 
aliyah was to be brought about by God alone;64  any effort on the part of Jews to return 
on their own, even if forced to by secular authorities, ran counter to the will of God.65 
Nevertheless, all the scripturally derived teachings about the preeminent position 
of the Jewish people before God, the divine importance of the land of Israel and the 
expected messiah with his millennial kingdom coalesce to make issues like Jewish 
settlements in the Occupied Territories and the status of Jerusalem, and thus of the 
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Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, extremely explosive and radicalizing topics for religious 
Zionists and their accompanying extremist elements.  Of course, as accessible as these 
teachings are for anyone able to read the Torah and Talmud, the role of a few influential 
Jewish rabbis in the interpretation and appropriation of these scriptures for the present 
day has been colossal, and this is where we turn our attention next. 
2. Rabbis 
a. Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Hakohen Kook 
Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Hakohen Kook (also known as Abraham Isaak 
Kook)—a Lithuanian who came to Palestine in 1904—is regarded by many as one of the 
preeminent spiritual fathers of religious Zionism, and especially of the Jewish extremist 
group Gush Emunim, which will be discussed later.66  Central for Kook the Elder (so-
called to distinguish him from his son, Tzvi Yehudah) was a devotion to Torah.  Unlike 
his Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox brethren, however, he was an avid believer that his 
fellow Jews needed to recognize documents like the Balfour Declaration as part of God’s 
planned and promised redemption of Israel. 
Kook the Elder lived and worked during a time when secular Zionism was 
king.  He nevertheless saw much that excited his religious expectations for the divine 
redemption of Israel.  In addition to Balfour’s note to Rothschild, U.S. President Wilson’s 
liberal politics were tilling new soil for national self-determination and the floodgates of 
immigration had been opened for European Jews to immigrate to Palestine.67 
Writing from the port city of Jaffa (in what was then part of the Ottoman-
ruled Vilayet of Beirut) in 1906 and 1907, Kook the Elder called upon Jews in the 
Diaspora to “come to the land of Israel, dear brothers…save your souls, the soul of your 
generations, yea, the soul of our entire nation.”68  Kook quoted scripture from the prophet 
Isaiah about the restoration of Jerusalem, telling how his addressees would find joy and 
restoration in the land of Israel.  He denounced Jews who spoke against returning to their 
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ancestral home, equating them with the 10 spies that Moses sent to reconnoiter the 
Promised Land, who returned from their mission expressing grave doubts that it could be 
taken.69 
Prior to the release of the Balfour Declaration in 1917, Rabbi Kook wrote 
an open letter to the London Times expressing his view that the national (i.e., secular) and 
religious aims of Judaism could not be divorced from each other.  He cited a Sabbath 
prayer which reads, “’You [God] are One, and your Name is One;  and what nation is like 
your one people Israel on earth,’” as support for this conviction.70  Despite his opinion 
regarding the unity of political and religious Zionist efforts, in a longer letter, Kook 
related concerns that secular Zionism had potential to supplant the foundational religious 
duties of learning Hebrew and studying Torah in the minds of Jewish youth.  He worried 
that the younger generation of Jews would (and indeed already had) begun to abandon 
the two time-honored foundations in favor of Zionist pursuits as the sole manner of 
practicing Judaism.  Kook disputed the claim of the secular Zionist pioneer Theodor 
Herzl who claimed before the First Zionist Congress that “Zionism [was] neutral in all 
religious questions.”71  In Kook’s estimation, any conception of the Jewish people living 
as a nation in the land of Israel was eternally tied their observation of the laws and 
commands of God as laid out in this scripture: 
If, then, you faithfully keep all this Instruction [sic] that I command you, 
loving the LORD [sic] your God, walking in all His [sic] ways, and 
holding fast to Him, the LORD will dislodge before you all these nations:  
you will dispossess nations greater and more numerous than you.  Every 
spot on which your foot treads shall be yours;  your territory shall extend 
from the wilderness to the Lebanon and from the River—the Euphrates—
to the Western Sea.  No man shall stand up to you:  the LORD your God 
will put the dread and the fear of you over the whole land in which you set 
foot, as He promised you.72 
Rabbi Kook called upon his fellow Jews, particularly the secular Zionists, 
to recognize the centrality of “faith and observance of Torah and the 
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commandments…[as] a national issue and a principal foundation” of Zionism.73  Were 
they to do so, Kook claimed, God would fulfill the scriptural promise, again from 
Deuteronomy: 
‘then the Lord your God will turn your captivity, and will have 
compassion on you, and will return and gather you form all the nations, 
amongst whom the Lord they [sic] God has scattered you.  If your outcast 
be at the utmost parts of heaven, from there will the Lord your God gather 
you, and from there will he fetch you and the Lord your God, [sic] will 
bring you into the land which your fathers possessed and you shall possess 
it.’74 
To counter the influence of secular Zionism and appeal to the ultra-
Orthodox Haredim, Kook the Elder established the “Banner of Jerusalem” (Degel 
Yerushalayim) organization in 1919.75  Kook used Jerusalem as a central theme for this 
movement because it “[expressed] the goal of attaining holiness in itself as the highest 
idealistic tenet of our Jewish existence,” and for its centrality as home to the Temple (he 
refers to it in the future tense) and source of Jewish political and legal authority.76  As he 
was writing to the Haredim, Kook made skilful use of prophetic scriptures about the 
promised return of a remnant of Jewish exiles to the land of Israel.  To succeed at nation-
building in the land of Israel, Jews needed to work in concert and to “’walk in the light of 
the Lord.’”77  To explain the “present wondrous times,” Kook recalled the words of God 
to the prophet Zechariah, wherein God promised to “’ cause the remnant of this people to 
inherit’” divine agricultural blessing in their land and ultimately bless all the nations of 
the earth.78  Finally, Kook invited Jews everywhere to join the Banner of Jerusalem, 
citing the prophet Jeremiah:  “‘You that have escaped the sword—which is driving you in 
all ages through all the lands of your exile—go you, stand not still, remember the Lord 
from afar and let the memory of Jerusalem rise within your hearts.’”79 
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Bezalel Naor, translator of one of Kook the Elder’s seminal works, Orot 
(“Lights”), detailed some of Kook’s specific plans for the Banner of Jerusalem:  he 
intended it to found “a universal yeshivah and a supreme religious court (precursor of a 
[new] Sanhedrin)” in Jerusalem.80  Soon after making these proposals, Kook the Elder 
became the “Rav of Jerusalem” in 1919—a key rabbinical position that situated him 
amongst a small number of official Jewish religious authorities in pre-1948 Palestine.81  
Orot was published between 1919 and 1920 under the auspices of his new office of Rav 
of Jerusalem—it was essentially the manifesto of the Banner of Jerusalem.  The book 
made a scandalous splash among Kook’s rabbinical seniors in Jerusalem, seven of whom 
came out with an open letter condemning the work for its dangerous enticement of young 
Jewish yeshivah students into the Zionist camp.  In it, Kook the Elder argued that “the 
spirit of the Lord and the spirit of Israel are one,” and thus religious Jews in particular 
had no grounds for rejecting the national aims of Zionism.82  The “Light of Messiah who 
ingathers exiles” would appear as the Jews in Diaspora returned to the land—essentially, 
the return to the ancient land had messianic implications, the immanent setting-to-right of 
the ills of Jews and the world at-large.83  As the return transpired, God’s word to the 
prophet Jeremiah would be fulfilled:  “’there is a reward for your effort, says the Lord, 
and they shall return from an enemy land…the children will return to their borders.’”84 
According to Kook the Elder’s reading of Torah, the Jewish people could 
not properly fulfill the commands of God given to the patriarch Moses if they did not 
reside in the Land of Israel.  As an example, he cited the command of God in the book of 
Leviticus to the effect that the priests who made sacrifices for the forgiveness of Israel’s 
sins on the Temple altar were to ensure “’an eternal flame shall burn on the altar, it shall 
not be extinguished.’”85  This comprised yet another compelling reason for Jews to return 
to the land of Israel—nowhere else could they be forgiven of their sins and live once 
again in a right relationship with God.  Kook’s millennial view, based upon his 
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interpretation of the first four verses of the second chapter of Isaiah, was that the entire 
earth was “doomed and on its ruins [would] be established a world order of truth and 
God-consciousness,” an order to be established at the (rebuilt) Temple in Jerusalem 
where “’at the end of days, the mountain of the house of the Lord will be 
established…exalted above the hills, and all the nations will stream to it.’” 86  These 
teachings Kook the Elder drew out of ancient Jewish scripture were appropriated by 
religious Zionists who took them as divine guidance for their task of “redeeming” Gaza, 
Judea and Samaria (the Occupied Territories) for Israel. 
Kook the Elder’s powerful legacy to Jewish religious extremism was that 
“he modernized religion and ‘nationalized’ it and even rendered modern nationalism a 
key issue for religion.  Yet he did not divorce religion from its old symbols and 
traditional norms;  on the contrary, he gave them a considerable reinforcement.”87 
b. Rabbi Tzvi Yehudah Hakohen Kook 
Rabbi Tzvi Yehudah Hakohen Kook (hereafter called “Kook the 
Younger”), Abraham Isaak Kook’s son, was the one who took on Kook the Elder’s 
mantle, disseminating his father’s teachings among a group of disciples whose children 
eventually became the progenitors of Gush Emunim (GE)—“the successors of the 
Kookist doctrine [who inherited] the declining [secular] Zionism” in the 1970s and 80s.88  
Kook the Younger took over the Merkaz Harav yeshiva his father had started and used it 
to prime his students for the redemption of the whole land of Israel.  His students 
interpreted his public lament about the fractured status of the land just three weeks prior 
to the ’67 War as prophetic when Israel took Jerusalem and the Temple Mount (along 
with Gaza, Judea and Samaria) at the end of that conflict. Tzvi Yehudah’s treatise on the 
outcome of the ’67 War took it “as a miracle embodying all the signs cited by the 
Prophets and the Halakhic authorities as indicating the coming of the Messiah.”89 
After the original religious Zionist party in the Israeli government, the 
National Religious Party (NRP), acquiesced to Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s                                                  
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signing of the Camp David Accords with Egypt in 1978, effectively giving the Sinai 
Peninsula and its settlements back to Egypt, Rabbi Kook the Younger wholeheartedly 
endorsed the withdrawal of GE members from the legacy NRP to form a new religious 
party.  This new organization, “Tenuat ha-Tehiya—Brit Ne’emanei Eretz Yisrael (The 
Renaissance Movement—The Covenant of the Upholders of the Land of Israel),” would 
be committed without compromise to acquiring and maintaining, as Kook put, all of 
Eretz Yisrael (“the Land of Israel”) under the umbrella of “the Torah of Yisrael and…the 
God of Yisrael.”90  Tehiya’s first three Members of Knesset (MKs) went to the Sinai 
settlement of Yamit in 1981 to demonstrate against “the ‘illegal’ act of the surrender of 
Israeli territories to the Egyptians;” an act showing greater allegiance to their scripturally-
motivated religious principles than to the political body they were serving.91  Tehiya 
joined the Likud (Begin’s party) to support the Israeli invasion of the Lebanon in 1982—
an act that yielded a cabinet minister’s portfolio to one of Tehiya’s founding members, 
Yuval Ne’eman, plus control of the “government settlement committee” and “500 million 
shekels for new ventures in the West Bank.”92  So, the simple rabbi and his teachings 
came to have influence in the highest circles of Israeli government. 
Like his father, Kook the younger “saw no line between theology and day-
to-day politics.”93  He believed that the existence of the state of Israel coupled with the 
successful annexation of Jerusalem and the Occupied Territories in the ’67 War was 
sufficient evidence that God’s redemption was already occurring.  While believing in 
God’s omnipotent control over human existence, Kook the Younger nonetheless urged 
his followers to take an active role in bringing Gods plan about.  Since God had 
commanded Israel to take their land in the Torah, Kook taught that “the believers’ task 
was to take possession of the newly conquered land by settling it.”94  In spite of this 
religious enthusiasm, however, he joined many other chief rabbis in Israel urging Jews to 
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restrict their religious activities in Jerusalem to the Western Wall (a.k.a., the “Wailing 
Wall”) and avoid entering the Temple Mount itself.95 
c. Rabbi Meir Kahane 
Another more recent stalwart of religious Zionist extremism was Rabbi 
Meir Kahane.  An American Jew from New York, he immigrated to Israel in 1971, where 
he started the Kach party, a religious extremist organization that advocated “expulsion of 
all Arabs from Israel and the occupied territories…[and erasing] the mosques from the 
Temple Mount.’”96  Kahane was a racist in addition to being a religious Zionist, and this 
fact distinguished his movement from those of other religious Zionist extremists. 
Kahane was imprisoned by Israeli authorities in 1980 for plotting against 
the Muslim shrines at the Haram al-Sharif.  He planned to hit the Dome of the Rock 
“with a long-range missile”—a plot that would have done little structural harm to them, 
but would nonetheless have been an incitement of Muslim-Jewish violence.97  Generally 
speaking, Kahane was a thug who believed that religious Jews did their best for God 
when they were strong and stood up against their enemies,  even if their actions were less 
than savory.  Of course, in post-Oslo I Israel, Kahane’s call for Jews to band together for 
self defense have proven largely unnecessary because the need for it “has been realized in 
the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).”98  Nevertheless, Kahane reserved vitriol for the state of 
Israel should it prove “unable or unready to react in kind against those who spill ‘so much 
as one drop of Jewish blood,’” calling upon Israeli citizens themselves to take up arms in 
such an event.99  The effectiveness of the IDF in protecting the state and its citizens up to 
the present, to include the settlements in the Occupied Territories, may explain in part 
why we have not seen more religious Zionist extremist violence since September 1993.  
This topic will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
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Meir Kahane was an attention-hungry progenitor of violent, racist attitudes 
and actions toward Palestinians.100  He went so far as to say that it was “Hillul Hashem, a 
desecration of the name of God” to be afraid of them.101  Kahane even denounced one of 
his former heroes, Menachem Begin, after the latter agreed to surrender the Sinai in the 
Camp David Accords in 1978.  This betrayal of scriptural principles caused Kahane to 
turn his back on the Israeli political process and set himself on a course of violent 
expression of his extremist doctrines.102  His scriptural interpretations were “even more 
rigid” and dogmatic than were those of GE, and they were experiencing increasing 
popular acceptance even into the early 1990s.103 
Though Kahane was not the theologian that Kook the Elder was, he 
nonetheless developed “a cohesive system of religious ideology.”104  By his own 
admission, he modeled his life after King David, who “’studied every night, and in the 
morning…would wake up and make war.’”105  Kahane drew very selectively from the 
Torah and held dogmatically to doctrines he chose.  A die-hard believer in the inerrancy 
of scripture, his system of thought left no room for compromise.  He viewed God as a 
“supreme and sovereign warlord who must be totally obeyed,” and as a being who, “if his 
instructions are carefully followed, He is pleased;  if they are disregarded, He gets 
angry.”106  Unlike most Jewish scholars, Kahane rarely cited rabbinic traditions in his 
interpretations of halakha (Jewish law), and similarly, the yeshiva he started in 1974, the 
“Center of the Jewish Idea,” existed to push his teachings over those of a longer, older 
tradition.107  He held the Arabs responsible for the difficulties faced by Israel and wrote 
predictions of a Holocaust worse than that perpetrated by the Nazis if the nation of Israel 
failed its divinely assigned task of rooting out the Arabs from the land and eradicating the 
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Haram al-Sharif.108  Among Kahane’s greatest fears was that the Israeli government 
would follow the egalitarian principles in the state’s Declaration of Independence and 
offer freedom to the Arabs of the region.  Kahane believed that this could lead to Arabs 
eventually out-numbering Jews and taking control of the Knesset, changing Israel to 
Palestine, cancelling right-of-return for Diaspora Jews and ultimately killing Zionism 
altogether.109  The standing scriptural promise of the Promised Land to the Jewish 
descendants of Abraham and Sarah meant, in Kahane’s view, that Israel ought to be “’not 
only…a sovereign state but…[sovereign] over the borders of the entire Eretz 
Yisrael.’”110  This de-legitimized Israel’s neighboring Arab lands as “illegal usurpers.”111  
He advocated making an offer to the Arabs like that made by Joshua to the Canaanites:  
“leave the land, fight for it and bear the consequences, or peacefully surrender to the Jews 
and obtain the status of loyal resident alien.”112 
Meir Kahane was assassinated in New York City on November 5, 1990, 
but the draw of his scripturally-based, Israeli-centric, anti-Arab activism was evidenced 
by the 20,000 mourners that attended his funeral in Israel.113 
d. Binyamin Kahane 
Binyamin Kahane, son of Rabbi Meir Kahane, carried on his father’s work 
after the elder’s assassination.  Little is known of him beyond the fact that he founded the 
group “Kahane Chai,” meaning “Kahane Lives,” to pick up where Rabbi Kahane’s Kach 
group left off.  Binyamin and his wife were assassinated in December 2000.114  His death 
came at the hands of Palestinian gunmen who fired on Kahane’s automobile while he and 
his spouse were driving near the Palestinian city of Ramallah in the West Bank.115 
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D. CONCLUSION 
As has been shown, religious Zionism has from its inception distinguished itself 
from the secular Zionist movement that was instrumental in founding the state of Israel, 
though at times it has allied with secular entities for its own self-interests.  Foundational 
scriptural teachings about the divinely-appointed preeminence of the Jewish people 
ethnically and religiously, about the eternal bequest of the land of Israel to them and 
about future messianic and millennial events are all part of the equation that has driven 
religious Zionist extremism in its own path away from secular (and religious) moderates.  
Enigmatic leaders like the Rabbis Kook and Rabbi Kahane have appropriated these 
doctrines for the modern Israeli religious Zionist movement, laying the pilings beneath 
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III. RELIGIOUS ZIONIST GROUPS:  FOUNDATIONS, GROUP 
PROFILES & ACTIVITIES SINCE OSLO I 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With age-old religious doctrines and traditions readily available, and living sages 
to provide guidance, a couple of key religious Zionist extremist groups emerged to bring 
religious conviction to bear on present circumstances in Israel and the Occupied 
Territories.  Gush Emunim (GE) and Kach arose in the years following the ’67 War and 
became the vanguard of religious Zionism throughout the 1970s and 1980s.  The 
religious tenets which these groups put hands and feet on have played a both a causal and 
a sustaining role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict up to the present, inspiring religiously-
motivated violence, providing education and ideological safe-harbor for religious Zionist 
settlers and even wielding key policy-making positions in the Israeli government.  
Probably the decisive fact on the ground that they have helped create are the Jewish 
settlements in the Occupied Territories (the OT), which the Israeli government has been 
compelled to defend.  Additionally, though both groups have only played isolated roles in 
religious extremist violence in Israel and the OT since the signing of Oslo I in 1993, they 
have inspired and supported those religious Zionist individuals and groups who have used 
violence to oppose peace initiatives and incite the Palestinians.   
B. GUSH EMUNIM (GE) 
Gush Emunim (GE; “bloc of the faithful”) was called “the most original and 
influential component of the new [religious] radicalism” in Israel by Ehud Sprinzak, a 
scholar whose life’s work was to study the Israeli extreme right.116  Gideon Aran, a 
professor at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, who studied Gush Emunim at length and 
published the results of his research among members and leaders of the movement in the 
Occupied Territories wrote that GE has a vested interest in firmly establishing and 
preserving the Jewish nation of Israel in the land of Israel.  Unlike the secular Zionists, 
GE’s motivation behind this interest is deeply rooted in religious precepts.  The study of 
Torah and pursuit of rigorous religious study is every bit as important to GE as it is to the 
ultra-Orthodox Haredim, but GE considers the conquest of the land as the logical outflow 
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of this religious zeal.  A central religious school for GE supporting its religious pursuits 
from its inception has been Rabbi Kook the Elder’s Merkaz Harav yeshiva in 
Jerusalem.117  Members of GE see themselves as the heirs of thousands of years of 
Jewish scripture and tradition;  a legacy which demands their active involvement in 
“redeeming” all of the land of Israel for the Jewish nation.  As has already been 
mentioned, 
the chief public manifestation of [GE] is its settlements, the earliest and 
most important of which were founded contrary to government decision 
and against the will of significant segments of the Israeli public…[and 
which represent] a planned effort to force the inclusion of [Judea, Samaria 
and Gaza] within the boundaries of legitimate Israeli control.118 
GE’s founders were first becoming active between the euphoria that followed the 
capture of Jerusalem and the Occupied Territories during the 1967 War and the period of 
national disenchantment that came in the wake of the October 1973 War.  The 
movement’s first settlement in the Occupied Territories was established between 
Bethlehem and Hebron soon after the end of the ’67 War by one of Kook the Younger’s 
protégés, Hanan Porat.119  A second disciple of Tzvi Yehudah Kook, Rabbi Moshe 
Levinger, and a small group of his followers settled in the city of Hebron in 1968.  This 
was the first of what would eventually amount to well over 100 settlements populated by 
hundreds of thousands of Jews (many of them GE activists).120  From humble beginnings 
in the Sinai Peninsula (before implementation of Israeli-Egyptian peace accords), to the 
Golan Heights and ultimately to Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), GE busied itself 
creating new realities with which all sides, from the Israeli government to the 
Palestinians, were forced to reckon.  Even the large present-day settlement of Maale 
Adumim east of Jerusalem was planted by GE activists.121 
According to Aran, GE is comprised of “an activist core group of observant Jews, 
mainly yeshiva students, teachers and graduates—young people who number at most 
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several thousand.”122  These members come predominantly from middle income 
Ashkenazi families, they are well-educated (often within the Merkaz Harav yeshiva) and 
tend to draw from an age-group who were 25-40 year-olds in the 1970s when GE made 
its public debut.  Adherents of GE have also, because of the insular nature of the 
settlements and their commitment to yeshiva education from the earliest age, built a 
cradle-to-grave society in which to grow and sustain membership.  Issuing from 
foundations of this nature, GE members are generally very well indoctrinated in their 
beliefs, and are ready to explain and defend them—this is true of women as well as of 
men.123  As of 1991, Aran reported that 15 percent of Israel’s 3.5 million Jews were 
“religious,” and that among these there was considerable skepticism toward GE.  
However, he also recorded that support for GE was strong among those of “the hawkish 
political conception represented by the Likud and factions to the right of it…[comprising] 
approximately half the Jews in Israel.”124  A study entitled Jewish Settler Violence 
contained results of a survey of GE members, “60 percent of [whom] state that halakhic 
precepts represented their predominant settlement motivation,” and who also revealed in 
their responses “that religious attitudes are far more influential than Zionist views 
regarding support of ‘serious anti-Government violence.’”125  It likewise pointed to “a 
significant link…between a messianic outlook and the sanctioning of vigilante action 
towards local Arabs.”126  Though Ehud Sprinzak also corroborated the existence of 
“hundreds of thousands of Israelis who share the beliefs and orientations of the radical 
right, almost all,” he said, were ignorant of GE (and Kach’s) religious dogmas, “and 
precious few [followed] their religious practice.”127  Despite the appearance of a rather 
broad base of support, Sprinzak stated in 1991 that the “hard core” of GE settlers—those 
who were acting truly out of religious convictions—“[did] not exceed 15,000.”128  
Sprinzak revealed that GE’s interpretation of Judaism, 
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commands them to sanctify every single acre of land that was promised to 
Abraham by God.  It tells them that they are living in an age of redemption 
in which they must follow the course of the great biblical conquerors, 
Joshua and King David, by settling all the territories that were recovered 
by the Joshuas of our time.129 
Gideon Aran wrote that “GE’s eschatological vision of the future [foresaw] Israeli 
sovereignty over all the Land of Israel within its maximum biblical boundaries (from the 
Euphrates River in Iraq to the Brook of Egypt), and centers on the rebuilt Temple as the 
focus of both religious and national life.”130  He continued later by explaining that, “the 
Six-Day War transformed the whole land of Israel from a distant dream…into an 
immediate physical and political reality.  Thus a messianic principle thousands of years 
old was inadvertently realized in one fell swoop.”131  Gershom Gorenberg added that the 
outcome of the ’67 War, even for non-religious Israeli Jews, increased the market for 
religious and messianic ideas, making them into “a respected ideology, powering the 
movement that settled Jews across the West Bank.”132 
The spiritual fathers of GE were the late Rabbi Abraham Isaak Kook and his son, 
Rabbi Tzvi Yehudah Kook.  Although Kook the Elder did not live to see GE’s birth, his 
son seized upon the portents of post-‘67 War reality in Israel and used them to lay GE’s 
theological moorings:  that the divine redemption of the land and people of Israel began 
with the establishment of the state of Israel;  and that even though the Messiah had not 
yet manifested himself, the necessary precursors for this were in-place.  Kook the 
Younger also taught that since Israel constituted “the very fulfillment of the messianic 
ideal, precisely as it was envisioned by the Prophets…reinforcing the Israeli Army [was] 
a vital religious and spiritual matter, at least equivalent to glorifying the Torah by 
increasing the number of yeshivas.”133 
Despite the existence of a seemingly common religious approach to Israeli 
politics, GE should not be conflated with the right-wing Likud Party in present-day 
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Israeli politics.  The movement came into its own, under secular, Labor governments, and 
thus predated Likud prominence.134  The ascendance of the Likud under Menachem 
Begin and Ariel Sharon in the late 1970s, though it initially appeared to be a boon for 
GE, actually complicated things considerably for the movement.  Likud initially 
exploited its common ground with GE, turning the settlement movement into a 
boomtown prospect.  However, sharing exposure with the Israeli government on the 
national stage threatened to marginalize GE altogether.  GE did benefit from Likud being 
in power.  It effectively became part of the establishment, gaining cabinet portfolios, 
political offices, government bureaucracies and “established organic units of settlers 
[within the IDF], with their own arms and command, [which dealt] with their Palestinian 
neighbors both within and outside the limits of their military authority.”135 
Nevertheless, Likud government brought GE to a crisis point.  The 1978 Camp 
David Accords with Egypt signed by the Likud government dashed GE’s hopes.136  
Withdrawal from the Yamit settlement in Sinai coupled with Israel’s turn away from the 
Likud after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 thrust GE to the margins and tilled 
fallow ground for extreme elements within GE to take matters into their own hands.  A 
sub-group of GE known as the “Jewish Underground in the Territories”—perhaps 
drawing a parallel to the armed Jewish gangs who fought the Nazis in Occupied 
Europe—began taking their battle to the Palestinians, targeting local officials, murdering 
Islamic students, conspiring in bomb attacks on Palestinian buses and ultimately a “plot 
to blow up the mosques on the Temple Mount.”137 
The 1987 Palestinian Intifada brought GE back to the fore, and in the course of 
doing so cemented the reality that the Jewish settlers’ struggle was not just with the 
secular Israeli government but also “with the neighboring Arab population.”138  GE 
derived legitimacy, though not without internal debate, for their war against Palestinian 
Arabs by citing “the biblical account of Simeon and Levi, the sons of Jacob, who 
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slaughtered all the inhabitants of Shechem in retribution for the rape of their sister, 
Dinah.”139  The application of ancient scriptural precedent and principles to modern 
problems was, of course, well-accepted among GE adherents.  This often put GE at odds 
with even more conservative ultra-Orthodox Jews who interpreted these historical 
examples differently.  GE looked to “a forum of GE rabbis, most of whom were settlers 
themselves and all of whom were followers of the Rabbis Kook and associated with the 
Merkaz Harav yeshiva.”140  This forum would convene to consider all manner of 
questions in the light of their interpretation of Torah:  from whether the unity of all Jews 
or securing the land of Israel was more important, to whether Jewish law allowed for 
killing Palestinians, to whether or not journalists covering events in the Occupied 
Territories were legitimate targets, to ascertaining whether it was permissible to assist 
Palestinian Arab collaborators.141 
As previously mentioned, GE has been committed to reclaiming the whole land of 
Israel as defined in the Torah for the Jewish people.  It was “a divine precept,” whose 
origins were founded on scripture.142 
’you shall dispossess all the inhabitants of the land…  And you shall take 
possession of the land and settle in it, for I have assigned the land to you 
to possess… But if you do not possess the land, those whom you allow to 
remain shall be stings in your eyes and thorns in your sides, and they shall 
harass you in the land in which you live;  so that I will do to you what I 
planned to do to them.’143 
When the LORD your God brings you to the land that you are about to 
enter and possess, and He dislodges many nations before you…seven 
nations much larger than you—and the LORD your God delivers them to 
you and you defeat them, you must doom them to destruction:  grant them 
no terms and give them no quarter.144 
After the death of Moses the servant of the LORD, the LORD said to 
Joshua son of Nun…  ‘Prepare to cross the Jordan, together with all this 
people, into the land that I am giving to the Israelites.  Every spot on 
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which your foot treads I give to you as I promised Moses.  Your territory 
shall extend from the wilderness and the Lebanon to the Great River, the 
Euphrates…and up to the Mediterranean Sea on the west.’145 
Obviously, if the members of GE were to follow all these commands to the letter 
prospects for their support of any peace agreement with Palestinians reserving anything 
less than all of the biblical land of Israel to the Jews are nil.  From the perspective of a 
scripture-based Zionist group like GE, the national identity of the Arab party to peace 
negotiations, be it Jordanian, Syrian, Egyptian, Lebanese or Palestinian, is immaterial. 
Aran paints the picture this way: 
The claims of the other side are considered irrelevant and its rights are in 
principle unrecognized, regardless of their content.  Decision making 
should not consider the other side, since affairs between Israel and the 
Gentiles are of no account, only those between Israel and itself.  Peace is 
exclusively a Jewish matter.  Middle East politics in general are only a 
secondary concern.   Peace is something between the nation and its God, 
between Israel, the Torah, and faith—not a complex web of diplomatic or 
strategic relations between communities and states but rather a spiritual 
orientation toward the sacred.  Once this fundamental principle is 
acknowledged, everything else will fall into place of itself.146 
The penultimate goal of GE (not to mention of its fellow Jewish religious 
extremist groups as well) “is the worship of God in the Holy Temple, standing intact on 
its original site.”147  Palestinian claims on former lands in Israel and all other extant 
religious animosities between Muslims and Jews aside, this final expectation of GE has 
perhaps the greatest potential to ignite a full-scale holy war.  This yearning for the 
Temple is not unique to GE amongst Jewish religious extremist organizations, though it 
could be argued that they helped establish the issue as a central theme of religious 
Zionism.  For GE, actions by the Israeli government to ratify and implement treaties 
withdrawing from and returning land to Arabs is viewed as much more than a tactical or 
strategic error, it amounts to “sin from the Jewish perspective, and…spiritual and 
physical suicide.”148 
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It may seem odd that since the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority 
(P.A.) signed the Oslo I peace agreement, GE has not claimed responsibility for violent 
acts protesting the accord.  Nevertheless, GE was the standard bearer for one of the 
largest sticking points in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict:  settlements in Judea, Samaria 
and Gaza (the Occupied Territories).  These settlements were home to 238,300 Israelis as 
of 2005, according to the Statistical Abstract of Israel 2005.149  At first glance, this may 
not seem to be an overwhelming number, especially considering that the number should 
have decreased by approximately 8,500 concurrent with the June 2005 Israeli evacuation 
of all Gaza and a handful of West Bank settlements.150  However, this cantankerous issue 
is far from settled.  According to the Israeli government’s own records, the population of 
Judea, Samaria and Gaza, a meager 1,500 at the first official count in 1972, increased 
nearly 16 times to 23,700 in 1983, and then expanded again by more than five times to 
134,300 by 1995.151  These numbers do not account for those Israeli settlers who have 
moved into formerly Arab-controlled parts of East Jerusalem—Israeli Central Bureau of 
Statistics records only divide the Jewish population of Jerusalem between the “Judean 
Foothills” and “Judean Mountains.”152  Even without including East Jerusalem in the 
equation, the 2005 settler population of 238,300 is nearly double the 1995 count—
evidence that the legacy of the religiously-inspired Jewish settlement movement  (as cited 
previously by Gideon Aran) has taken on a life of its own, expanding in spite of the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations inaugurated in 1993.   
C. KACH & KAHANE CHAI 
Kach, meaning “Thus!” in Hebrew, was the renamed Israeli version of Rabbi 
Meir Kahane’s Jewish Defense League (JDL), adopting the new moniker in 1975.153  
From Kahane’s base in the settlement of Kiryat Arba, Kach embarked upon a program of 
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violence against the Palestinian Arabs, one Kahane hoped would distinguish it from 
religious organizations like the NRP, which supported conceding land for peace with the 
Arabs, and even from hard-line organizations such as GE.  Though Kach sought to enter 
the Israeli political process, in the 1984 elections (13 years after Meir Kahane came to 
Israel) they managed to garner only 1 seat (representing 1.3 percent of Israeli voters) in 
the Knesset.154  This seems a small victory indeed, but the confluence of forces that led 
to the single Kach seat for Meir Kahane in the Knesset was significant. 
Israelis saw, or perceived, an escalating loss of low-income jobs to Israeli and 
Palestinian Arabs, the same Arabs who seemed increasingly enamored with the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and its goal of making the Jewish state of 
Israel a thing of the past.155  This greatly increased the magnetism of Kach and its 
ideology.  The popularity of Kach’s stance as seen from Kahane’s election to the Knesset 
showed broadening support for Kahane’s idea “that Palestinians should be deported to 
Arab countries and Israeli Arabs induced to emigrate.”156  As Ehud Sprinzak put it, 
“Kach people have never concealed their hope for a massive emigration” of Arabs out of 
Israel and the Occupied Territories.157  Arabs remaining or emigrating notwithstanding, 
Kach pursued policies of baiting and terrorizing them long before the First Intifada 
kicked off in the late 1980s. 
Bernard Avishai situated the first of Kach’s outright provocations of the 
Palestinians—Rabbi Kahane’s attempted bombing at the Haram al-Sharif  in April 1982, 
more than five years before the start of the Intifada—as an event that came on the heels 
of several months of Israeli annexation of Arab territories and meddling in Arab politics, 
as well as massive Palestinian uprisings.158  The organization seemingly had a knack for 
knowing when to stir the pot.  Of course, Kach’s anti-Palestinian operations redoubled 
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after the First Intifada began.  It began killing Arabs out of the conviction “that the 
decisive battle for Eretz Yisrael [had] already started.”159 
Concerns about Kach and the popularity of Rabbi Kahane’s views impacted more 
than the Palestinians.  When Kahane was elected to the Knesset, the Chief of Staff of the 
IDF undertook “an emergency program to teach recruits about the ‘virtues of 
democracy’” as a means to counter the growing influence of right-wing views on 
Zionism and the land of Israel.160 
Gideon Aran claimed that Kach enjoyed some membership crossover with GE, 
though he stopped shy of claiming any formal ties between the two groups.161  Despite 
this lack of formal ties with the Kookist settler organization, important individuals within 
Kach were former disciples of Kook the Younger, and as has already been mentioned, 
“the West Bank settlement of Kiryat Arba, founded by Kook followers, [had become] a 
center for Kahane supporters.”162  It was, in fact, the increasing radicalism of groups like 
GE and the success of religious extremist political parties such as Tehiya in the mid-
1980s that precipitated the ground swell of support for Kach in the elections.  This wave 
of popularity culminated in the Israeli government’s rescission of its prohibition against 
Rabbi Kahane’s involvement in Israeli politics.163 
While he was alive, Kahane exercised tight control over Kach, even from prison.  
Only in Kiryat Arba, the settlement where Kahane lived, was there a sufficient number of 
Kach members to undertake activities and political activity not directly involving Rabbi 
Kahane.164  Ehud Sprinzak pegged total Kach membership at no more than “a few dozens 
[sic] activists…who can be said to act out of fundamentalist motivations.”165  However, 
even after Kach was banned from Israeli politics in 1988, its activist confrontations with 
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Palestinian Arabs in contrast to the comparatively benign activities of GE and Tehiya 
(which focused principally on settlements in the OT) still resonated with many Israelis.166 
The Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB), an online research and analysis 
clearinghouse which collates worldwide terrorism-related data collected by the United 
States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the National Counterterrorism Center 
(NCTC), DFI International, the RAND Corporation and the University of Arkansas, 
claims that though it “has not officially claimed many attacks since being outlawed, Kach 
praises and supports any violence against Arabs.”167  Within the last year, Kach members 
have been accused by Israel prime minister Ariel Sharon of making threats against 
members of the government surrounding Israel’s now-completed evacuation of Gaza 
Strip settlements.  The prime minister also warned of the potential for “bloodshed” as a 
result of confrontations fomented by groups like Kach which are opposed to Israeli 
withdrawal from settlements.168 
As mentioned in the brief treatment of Binyamin Kahane, Kahane Chai, the Kach 
spinoff group he founded after his father’s assassination in 1990, carried on Kach’s 
extremist policies.  Kahane Chai’s principal objective is declared to be “[restoring] the 
biblical state of Israel [by] replacing democracy with theocracy.”169  Formally banned in 
Israel along with Kach under the 1948 Terrorism Law, Kahane Chai has nevertheless 
made its presence felt in Israel and in the West Bank.  Though their typical activities have 
centered more around criminal activity, Baruch Goldstein, perpetrator of the February 
1994 Ibrahimi mosque massacre in Hebron was listed as “a staunch Kahane Chai 
supporter.”170  According to the TKB, though Kach and Kahane Chai are technically 
separate organizations, “Kahane Chai is essentially an alias for Kach as the two groups 
have a shared core leadership and are referred to interchangeably in the media.”171  
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Though there were personality conflicts between Binyamin Kahane and the leaders of his 
father’s legacy group at one point, those disputes evaporated with Binyamin’s 
assassination in 2000.172 
The group is still very active in recruitment, in condemnation of the Israeli 
government and in its efforts to have the government ban on its political activities lifted.  
Like Kach, Kahane Chai has threatened to assassinate Israeli politicians who support 
disengagement plans in the Occupied Territories, as well as to destroy elements of Israeli 
national infrastructure in retaliation for implementation of any such plan.173  Though 
Kach and Kahane Chai have only committed a handful of violent acts since 1993 (four, 
to be exact), Baruch Goldstein’s murder of 39 Palestinian Muslim worshippers and injury 
of more than 250 others who were praying in a mosque at a shared Jewish-Muslim holy 
site was extremely provocative.174   Goldstein was not alone in sentiment, though he may 
have been in action.  Noteworthy troublemakers such as Yoel Lerner and Yisrael Ariel 
praised his exploit.175  Though it was not perpetrated by either group, peace-minded 
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s 1995 assassination by a lone religious Zionist 
extremist, Yigal Amir, who was a known Kach “sympathizer” is illustrative of the impact 
potential of even such small, outlawed religious extremist organizations as Kach (and 
Kahane Chai).176  In 1998, Kach was again implicated in violence, this time against its 
fellow countrymen—Israeli police alleged that Kach members burned the car of an Israeli 
MK (Member of Knesset) who was trying to get a shrine erected at Baruch Goldstein’s 
grave removed.177  After this incident, Kach was silent until 2002, when group activists 
were involved in stoning Palestinians’ vehicles in Jerusalem.178  No overt acts of 
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violence have been attributed to Kach or Kahane Chai since 2002—the groups’ primary 
activities in the present day seem, as already mentioned, to focus inward on opposing 
further surrender of territory in Judea and Samaria. 
D. OTHER GROUPS 
This nebulous category of “other” Jewish religious extremists contains what Ehud 
Sprinzak refers to as “cultural radicals;” those “who ideologically and politically stand 
somewhere between Gush Emunim and Rabbi Kahane, but feel uncomfortable with 
both.”179  Individuals or groups who fall into this category do not act in concert with one 
another, though they do “share the conviction that only a spiritual revolution could save 
the nation.”180  The real ideological power of these groups lies in the legitimacy they 
derive from being rabbi-led, versus acting alone.  Groups in this category, whether they 
are or are not affiliated with the principal actors in the religious Zionist camp, have all the 
same operated in pursuit of many of the same goals for religious reasons.  In both 
respects, these cultural radicals have a bent toward engaging in violence to block peace 
efforts or attack Arabs with or without encouragement from GE or followers of Kahane. 
One organization, known originally as the “Committee for the Preservation of 
Security,” was founded by Kach members in 1986 simply to protect roads used by Israeli 
settlers in the Occupied Territories from rock-throwing Palestinians.181  However, during 
the First Intifada, the organization “became a most aggressive vigilante group.”182  
TKB’s data on the “Committee for Security of the Highways” claims the group first 
surfaced in 1998, attacking the Palestinian Police in Hebron and Bethlehem,183 and then 
was dormant until 2001, when it was responsible for the deaths of three Palestinians and 
                                                 
179 Sprinzak, 251. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid. 237. 
182 Ibid. 
183 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. “Incident Profile:  Committee for the Security of the Highways 
Attacked Police Target (July 5, 1998, West Bank/Gaza).” [database on-line]; available from 
http://www.tkb.org/Incident.jsp?incID=11608;  Internet;  accessed 2 March 2006;  MIPT Terrorism 
Knowledge Base. “Incident Profile:  Committee for the Security of the Highways Attacked Police Target 
(July 15, 1998, West Bank/Gaza).” [database on-line]; available from 
http://www.tkb.org/Incident.jsp?incID=11607;  Internet;  accessed 2 March 2006. 
48 
the injury of seven others in two separate incidents.184  The Committee has not claimed 
responsibility for any violent acts since July 2001.  So, while its Kach forebear remains, 
the Committee seems to have either dissolved back into the ranks of its parent 
organization or gone entirely underground.185 
A final example of such a group has been referred to by the Israeli press as “the 
Jewish Underground,”186 and by the United States State Department as the “New Jewish 
Underground.”187  The State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2004 reported 
that an Israeli was tried and convicted in December 2004 for membership in this “terrorist 
organization that aimed to carry out attacks on Arab civilians;”  one whose name 
hearkens back to another group that operated under the same moniker in the 1980s.188  A 
chief participant and “ideologue of the Jewish underground in the Territories”189 in its 
early days, Yehudah Etzion, was part of a highly secretive mid-1980s plot to blow up the 
Dome of the Rock.190  Etzion was jailed in Israel both for the attempt on the Dome of the 
Rock and for his involvement in attempts to maim Palestinian politicians.191  He founded 
Ofrah, one of GE’s early settlements in the West Bank, with the help of a few GE 
acquaintances in 1974.192  His involvement in terrorist acts sprang from his conviction 
that the Muslim shrines on the Temple Mount were the primary obstacle behind “God’s 
refusal to move forward with redemption” as promised in the scriptures.  He believed the 
shrines constituted a “desecration” of God’s holy hill, an idea he may have gotten from 
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the book of Daniel.193  More recently, Etzion established a group called “Everlasting” 
(Hai Vekayam) whose activities focus on reasserting Israeli control of the Temple Mount 
and reinstating Jewish worship there.  It works in concert with the Temple Institute, 
founded by Rabbi Yisrael Ariel, and the Temple Mount Faithful, led by Gershon 
Salomon, in the effort to raise awareness of the cause amongst the Israeli public.194  
Etzion’s voice was loud enough even to secure a campaign promise from former Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to allow Jewish prayer on the Temple Mount.195  So, in 
yet another case, religious Zionists in a new generation are utilizing the doctrines and 
even the names of 1970s and 1980s religious Zionist organizations, while key leaders of 
the groups from the pre-Oslo I period continue their activities to secure permanent Jewish 
sovereignty over all of the land of Israel. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The beliefs and actions of the religious Zionist extremist organizations detailed in 
this chapter have been elemental complicating factors in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict;  particularly since the Oslo I agreement was signed in September 1993.  The 
settlement activities of GE in Gaza, Judea and Samaria have constituted one of the single 
most complicated realities to circumnavigate for parties desiring a peaceful resolution of 
the conflict.  GE-initiated settlements have grown exponentially, experiencing some of 
their largest growth periods in the time since Oslo I.  These have presented the 
Palestinians with faits accompli in the middle of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, lands 
they desire to be part of an independent Palestinian state.  Kach and Kahane Chai’s 
extreme agendas, though they have been outlawed, have played themselves out in at least 
two of the most violent, impact-laden atrocities committed by Jewish groups in the post-
Oslo I era:  the Ibrahimi mosque massacre, and the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, who 
was actively pursuing peace with Israel’s Arab neighbors.  Extremists hailing from or 
sympathizing with the aims of GE and Kach have also targeted the highly contentious 
Muslim holy shrine that dominates the real estate formerly occupied by the Jewish 
Temple, actions that threatened to ignite a holy war.  In aggregate, these religious factors 
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have represented tangible quandaries for peace negotiators by baiting the Palestinians and 
by placing the Israeli government in the difficult position between defending its citizens 
and territory on the one hand, and taking action antithetical to good faith peace 
negotiations in so doing on the other. 
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IV. PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC EXTREMISM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
It is now time to consider how religion has played a guiding and sustaining role 
for Muslim extremists in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  What is it within Islam that has 
radicalized individual Palestinian Muslims against the prospect of peace with Israel?  Are 
there canonical doctrines in Islamic scripture that predispose religious extremists to 
violently oppose a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on any terms other than 
the destruction of Israel?  If such doctrines exist, who has interpreted and propagated 
them for the believers?  In this chapter, we will first consider a brief history of Islamic 
extremism among the Palestinians leading up to the emergence of the principal 
Palestinian Islamic extremist groups in the 1970s and 1980s.  Next, we will look into 
scripture in search of teachings and themes which might be applied to the conflict, 
followed by an examination of the principal religious authorities which have interpreted 
applied these scriptures for the post-Oslo I generation. 
Similar to what was found in the case of religious Zionism, the reader will find 
that Palestinian Islamic extremists are opposed to peace with Israel, motivated by 
religious doctrines portraying Jews as polluters of true religion, the state of Israel as a 
blight on the house of Islam, Israeli sovereignty over the Haram al-Sharif as an 
abomination to Allah and the entire land of Palestine as a divinely-appointed religious 
trust (waqf) from Allah to the Muslims which has been stolen from them by the Jews and 
their allies in the West.  
Once again, the answer to the scriptural-basis question, this time for Islamic 
religious extremism, is of utmost importance to any party involved in trying to bring an 
end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Islamic extremist organizations, subscribing to 
scriptural doctrines and yielding only to divine authority, have increasingly engaged in 
acts of violence against Israelis with the expressed purpose of feeding the growing vortex 
of bad blood and mistrust, and reiterating their positions of abject refusal to accept the 
existence of any Jewish or Israeli state. 
52 
Islam is the youngest of the three great monotheistic faiths, and its birth and 
development starting from the 7th century A.D. was heavily impacted by the earlier 
emergence of Judaism and Christianity.  The scriptural texts of the three religions are 
littered with references to common patriarchs, prophets and doctrines covering broad 
areas of life and religious practice.  As a younger sibling would, however, Islam also 
makes pointed references to its uniqueness from its seniors, claiming ultimately that it 
both fulfills and supersedes them.  Not surprisingly, these latter claims, found in the 
monumental texts of the Qur’an and Hadith, as well as other writings, create vast open 
spaces for conflict, both ideological and physical, between Islam and, in this case, 
Judaism. Muslims who take their religious beliefs to the extreme have a full arsenal of 
doctrines from which to draw guidance and moral support in their struggle against Jews.  
Nowhere is this phenomenon more prevalent that in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
B. ROOTS OF PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC EXTREMISM  
Opposition to the state of Israel has been a calling-card of Palestinian Islamic 
extremists since long before Israel proclaimed its independence in 1948.  As early as the 
1920s, Islamic militants were actively opposing the Zionist movement that established 
the state of Israel.  ‘Izz el-Din al-Qassam was the highest profile martyr of the Islamic 
cause, killed by the British in 1935 while leading al-Kaff al-Aswad ( “the Black Hand”) 
in a Jihad against the Zionists and the British.196  It is not difficult to understand that 
hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, displaced by the renascent Jewish state, and their 
descendents would yearn to have their land back. Palestinian Arabs, who existed 
peacefully for hundreds of years under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Turks, were caught 
unprepared and disorganized by immigrating Jews, some of whom were eager to 
reestablish the land of their ancestors, and others who simply sought refuge from 
persecution in Europe and other parts of the world.  Bereft of land, livelihood and the 
opportunity for salient participation in the political process that governed their daily lives, 
Palestinians were instead relegated to isolated pockets in what was once the British 
Mandate of Palestine, or to refugee camps, or else were set adrift in the nations of Arab 
neighbors who fought in their defense one day, and tried to dump them off on some other 
country the next.  During this Nekba (“catastrophe”), the Palestinians lived largely under 
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the leadership of secular nationalist movements like the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO), whose Fatah party ran the Palestinian Authority (PA) until very recently, to 
govern them, provide basic goods and services and sue for their rights against what they 
viewed as an usurping foreign state. 
Into this fray came Sunni Muslim organizations like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
(Hariket al-Jihad al-Islami fi Filastin, or PIJ) and the Islamic Resistance Movement 
(Hariket al-Muqawwamat ul-Islamiyya, or Hamas), offering an alternative to PLO and 
PA services and adopting terrorist tactics to fight a Jihad against the Israelis.  Certainly 
these groups were born out of a genuine desire to aid Palestinians.  They may have also 
foreseen an opportunity to capitalize on the political vacuum created by the failures of the 
PA and surrounding Arab states.  Whatever the case, the groups also came preaching a 
religious message that resonated with Palestinian Muslims, one which it will be argued 
here has been a prime mover driving both organizations, as well as their offshoots and 
subsidiaries, in their ongoing Jihad to eradicate the state of Israel and replace it with an 
Islamic state of Palestine. 
The ancestral organization from which the majority of Palestinian Islamic 
extremist groups like the PIJ and Hamas stemmed is the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), 
which first appeared in Egypt under the leadership of a teacher named Hasan al-Banna.  
The MB started small in 1928, with al-Banna and only six followers;  however, by the 
end of its eleventh year of existence, estimated membership in the brotherhood was 
500,000.  The growth of the organization was sufficient that by 1953, it was reckoned to 
have over two million members in Egypt alone.197  The national life advocated by the 
MB was to be based upon Islamic principles, in order to restore the religion’s long-lost 
preeminence in government and society.  1920s Egypt where the MB started was still 
very much embroiled in struggle with de facto British occupation.  This state of affairs—
a predominantly Muslim land ruled by a nominally Christian imperial power—was 
detestable to MB founders and formed the backdrop for their emergence.  In spite of the 
MB’s Egyptian origins, their ideals and influence spread throughout the Arab Muslim 
world, resonating with Palestinian Arabs in their struggle against the British mandatory 
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regime and Zionist immigrants between the 1920s Ottoman implosion and 1947.198  The 
first official MB branch in Palestine was founded 1946.199   
The MB’s all-encompassing, back-to-basics Islamic approach gained considerable 
luster among downtrodden and disenfranchised Palestinians in the OT in the 1980s.  Cast 
opposite the corrupt and ineffective PLO in the OT, the Islamist appeal became that much 
more compelling.  It also did not hurt the MB cause that the Israelis themselves had been 
tacitly supporting and allowing them leeway to move and organize since the late 1970s, a 
policy motivated by a desire to prevent the PLO from consolidating control, rather than 
any genuine Israeli desire to see the MB succeed in place of the PLO.200 
As will be shown, the MB provided the structural and religious framework from 
which Islamic extremist groups like Hamas, the PIJ and their progeny emerged.  This is 
not to suggest that groups of this nature could not have formed independent of MB 
origins, but rather to highlight the centrality of the MB in the religious roots of many of 
the most violent Islamic extremist organizations operating in Palestine today.   
C. SCRIPTURAL FOUNDATIONS & TEACHINGS OF RELIGIOUS 
EXTREMIST LEADERS 
It is critical to our study to consider the role Islamic scriptures and religious 
teachers have played (and continue to play) in giving Palestinian Islamic extremists 
religious cause for their opposition to peace with Israel.  Richard Landes, Director of the 
Center for Millennial Studies (CMS) at Boston University, describes Islamic extremism 
as evidence of “revival movements that seek to return to the ‘fundamentals’ of the faith:  
Sharia (Islamic law), strict observances and purity concerns, and an implacably hostile 
attitude towards the secular world that undermines such efforts.”201  In the Islamic 
extremist idiom, the rise of the state of Israel has established a beachhead for Western 
corruption and secularism in the heart of Islam.  In the broadest sense, the war with Israel 
and the West is a physical manifestation of a larger spiritual reality that was foretold by 
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the Prophet at the dawn of Islam.  Far more than an argument about borders, Palestinian 
statehood, or any other secular consideration, this war is one with a strong scriptural basis 
and eternal implications, making it obligatory for all true Muslims to join the fight.202  
The Qur’an and Ahadith (plural of Hadith, Arabic for a tradition, act or saying of the 
Prophet Muhammad) together comprise this canon of Islamic scripture.  Of the two, the 
Qur’an is the text universally recognized across the Dar al-Islam (“house of Islam”), and 
will thus be the primary source for the first part of our study.203  After considering 
scripture, we will continue by looking at the key individuals who have interpreted these 
texts and appropriated them for Palestinian Islamic extremists.  At the conclusion of this 
section, the evidence will have shown that Islamic scriptures and religious teachers have 
provided profuse incitement to the religious extremists who have fomented violence in an 
effort to sustain the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
1. Islamic Scriptures 
Within the body of Islamic scripture, there are two major areas of doctrine 
possessing immediate applicability for Islamic extremists in their approach the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  These are:  teachings about the Jews themselves—their rejection of 
the Prophet and his message, their standing before Allah comparative to the Muslims and 
their place in the narrative of the apocalypse—and teachings surrounding the significance 
of the Haram al-Sharif. 
At first glance, certain statements about Jews in the Qur’an seem to indicate that 
Muhammad “allow[ed] the very real possibility that…[they had] a place in the pan-
monotheistic creed.”204  The Qur’an also corroborates, in a very loose sense, much of 
Jewish religious history and prophetic tradition, containing reference to no less than 46 
personages also found in the Jewish Tanakh (Bible), and recording countless other 
common doctrines, places and events.  However, as one can see from an examination of 
the differing accounts of these various personages that the Qur’an (the younger of the 
two scriptures by several centuries) contains many unexplained additions, omissions and 
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alterations on the Tanakh storylines.205  This inter-faith scriptural discord is explained 
away in the Qur’an—though without proofs or explanations—in one of its chief 
indictments of the Jews:  they changed the Torah from what Allah intended it to say, thus 
leaving it to the Qur’an to set things right.206  This theme will be developed further.  In 
the meantime, the attitude toward Jews goes downhill from these benign doctrines. 
Islamic scriptures address the Jewish people pejoratively countless times.  The 
majority of the Qur’an gives them little quarter, stating at one point that:  “’you will find 
the most hostile people to the [Muslim] believers to be the Jews and the polytheists.’”207  
In the preface to the 2002 edition of his book, End of Days, Gershom Gorenberg quotes 
‘Usama bin Laden saying this about Jews: 
We are sure of Allah’s victory and our victory against the Americans and 
the Jews, as promised by the Prophet, peace be upon him: ‘Judgment Day 
shall not come until the Muslims fight the Jews, where the Jews will hide 
behind trees and stones, and the tree and the stone will speak and say, 
‘Muslim, behind me is a Jew. Come and kill him.’208 
This quotation—a Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad—was cited by bin Laden in 
a 1998 interview with ABC News.  The particular Hadith he used “testifies that the 
contemporary conflict with Israel was foretold at the dawn of Islam…that the victory of 
the Muslims is assured and that nature itself will join the battle on their side.”209  Here, 
through the rare invective reserved for them, one begins to see how Jews are viewed as a 
principal adversary of Islam.  Bin Laden’s Hadith quotation is one example of this;  
another is the relegation of the Jews to being “companions of the Fire” —meaning that 
they are destined for Hell—because of their aforementioned alteration of the revelation 
given them by Allah.210  Regarding this rejection of the Prophet Muhammad and his 
message, Jews are criticized for accepting only part of Allah’s revelation, and for this are 
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consigned “to the most grievous chastisement” on the day of Resurrection.211  The 
indictment continues with Jews being referred to as Kafir (“one who commits apostasy 
from religion”) and cursed by Allah for failing to accept Islam.212  The Sura goes on to 
rebuke Jews for trying to convert those who would follow Islam, claiming that Islam, not 
Judaism, was the religion followed by Abraham, Isma’il, Isaac and Jacob.213  Ultimately, 
Sura 2 concludes that Jews failed to interpret Allah’s signs correctly, preferring to reject 
the authority of Islam.214  In Sura 5, it is recounted how Allah blessed Israel, making a 
covenant with them if they would follow His messengers and keep His commands;  
however, they failed to do so, thus Allah “cursed them and hardened their hearts,” again 
accusing them of altering His words and of being treacherous.215  Sura 19 indicates that 
though some Jews obeyed Allah (i.e., they embraced Islam), “after them came an evil 
generation, who wasted prayers and followed lusts, so they will meet perdition.”216  
Finally, Sura 98 once again clarifies that Jews who fail to accept the true religion (Islam) 
“will be in the Fire of hell, abiding therein.  They are the worst of creatures.”217 
The second major theme in the Qur’an regarding Jews surrounds the fact that they 
are not actually God’s chosen people as the Torah teaches, but that the Muslims hold this 
distinction.  In Sura 3, in what seems to be an invitation to Jews to submit to Islam, 
readers are enjoined not to reject Allah’s truth as delivered (in the first instance) to 
Abraham, who (so the Qur’an says) was not the father of the Jews, as the Torah says, but 
the first Muslim instead.218  Of course, there is also the question of which son of 
Abraham inherited the divine blessing.  As has already been mentioned, the Jews reckon 
that they are God’s people through descent from Abraham through his second son, Isaac.  
Muslims, however, derive from the Qur’an that the divinely favored descent came 
through Abraham’s elder son Isma’il, ancestor of the Prophet and his Arabian 
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compatriots, not through Isaac.219  The exclusivity of Judaism as a religion is attacked as 
well—though Muslims are instructed to forgive Jews for it—the Qur’an defies Jews to 
produce proof (which it assures they cannot do) that theirs is the only way to paradise.220  
Sura 45 claims that Israel, though they were granted multiple favors from Allah, 
ultimately walked away from the right path—the way now followed by Muslims.221  
Sura 62 assails Jews who believe that they are Allah’s chosen people;  it is written that 
Jews cannot face death with equanimity because they know that they have altered Allah’s 
revelation to them, and thus “that death from which [they] flee…will surely overtake 
[them].”222 
A third point of contention with the Jews that is raised in the Qur’an surrounds 
their role in the Islamic version of the apocalypse.  Richard Landes posted an interesting 
article on the CMS website in which he contended that Israel plays a central 
(antagonistic) role in the narrative of the apocalypse223 for many Islamic extremists.  For 
example, some Muslim theologians, such as Safar Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Hawali, use 
biblical (the book of Daniel) and Qur’anic (Sura 57) texts as evidence that the Al-Aqsa 
Intifada was a fulfillment of prophecy regarding the Masih al-Dajjal (“False Messiah”), 
whom it was foretold would desecrate the Haram al-Sharif.224  Muslim beliefs about the 
apocalypse have transformed considerably in the 26 years since the Iranian Revolution, 
taking on a much more activist form, particularly in relation to the Arab-Israeli struggle, 
among Palestinian Sunni militant groups such as Hamas and the PIJ.225 
Dr. David B. Cook, Landes’ associate at the CMS, lends more historical depth to 
this apocalyptic discussion that requires some explanation.  Cook contended that the 
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reluctance of scholars to attribute the explosive growth of early 7th century A.D. Islam to 
the potent religious belief of its adherents hamstrings modern observers of the religion 
“because contemporary Muslims themselves believe that their absolute faith in Allah and 
the unifying nature of Islam were the most important reasons for their [early] 
successes.”226  He added that early Muslims were driven by “the imperative to conquer 
the world before the expected Hour of Judgment ,” supporting his statement from a 
Hadith where the Prophet is quoted as saying:  “’Behold!  God sent me [the Prophet 
Muhammad]  with a sword, just before the Hour [of Judgment] , and placed my daily 
sustenance beneath the shadow of my spear, and humiliation and contempt on those who 
oppose me.’”227  From this, Cook concludes that the expansion of Islam was carried out 
based upon a scriptural mandate for Jihad against any who did not accept the Prophet’s 
message and embrace Islam.  The Islamic colossus that emerged from this first Jihad 
gave the Dar al-Islam preeminence over a swath of land and humanity stretching from 
the gates of Europe to the western marches of China.  However, the demise of the 
political, cultural and economic dominance of the Islamic Umma, especially in the last 80 
years since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, is seen by Islamic extremists as a trend 
that must be reversed.  The final straw for Muslims in this narrative is that their decline 
came at the hands of the non-Muslim West, and saw the Umma unable to repel the re-
establishment of a sovereign Jewish state in lands that had been predominantly under 
Muslim control since the time of the Prophet.  As Cook phrased it: 
Obviously God cannot be at fault for this situation—the Muslims 
themselves must be.  The perception is that God is testing the chosen few 
just before the end of the world.  They must prove their faith in God 
through worldly domination and the reestablishment of the God-ordained 
Muslim superiority.228 
Thus from this Islamic extremist interpretation, by allowing the Jewish state of 
Israel to continue to exist, Muslims are actually failing to pass Allah’s test of their faith.  
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The final, and perhaps most pregnant element in the Israeli-Palestinian quarrel for 
Palestinian Islamic extremists is the status of Jerusalem (al-Quds, meaning “holiness” in 
Arabic), and especially of the Haram al-Sharif.  Its central monument, the Dome of the 
Rock, was built by the Muslim Caliph ‘Abd al-Malik Ibn Marwan of Damascus in the 
year 691 A.D.229  The scriptural significance of the Dome of the Rock and its immediate 
surroundings is found in the Qur’an in the first verse of Surat Bani Isra’il (“The Israelites 
Chapter”), where it is written that Allah transported the Prophet Muhammad to the 
Masjid al-Aqsa ( “The Furthest Mosque”) “whose precincts We blessed.”230  As 
Gershom Gorenberg wrote, Islam teaches 
that the archangel Gabriel met Muhammad at night in Mecca, and led him 
to a winged steed named Buraq—lightning—on which he flew to 
Jerusalem, where he met the prophets who preceded him, including 
Abraham, Moses and Jesus, and Muhammad led them all in prayer.  
Muhammad then ascended to heaven, and the rock tried to follow him and 
the prophet or Gabriel had to hold it back, leaving hand or foot marks on 
it, and Muhammad was received by God.231 
Thus, because of the monumental events that transpired there, and because both 
the mosque and the blessing of Allah upon its environs are recorded in the Qur’an, it is 
absolutely out of the question that the site should ever be surrendered to Jewish control—
particularly to be altered or leveled in order to construct the Third Temple for the Jews.  
In fact, the Islamic Waqf trust that administers the Haram al-Sharif (with the permission 
of the Israeli government) published a pamphlet for visitors stating “’some believe [the 
Haram al-Sharif] was the site of the Temple of Solomon, peace be upon him…or the site 
of the Second Temple…although no documented historical or archaeological evidence 
exists to support this.’”232  Despite the scriptural significance of the shrine to Muslims 
and the fact that Israel continues to allow the Islamic Waqf to manage the site and restrict 
Jewish activities there, “in the eyes of Muslims, Islam is embattled [there], not 
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triumphant, and its hold on the Haram is threatened by the Jewish messianic vision.  
Anxious about the future, Muslims seek to erase the Temple from the site’s past.”233 
These four themes from the Islamic scriptures—that Jews are apostates from the 
true religion of Islam, that they are inferior to Muslims in the eyes of Allah, that they are 
the principal barrier in the way of apocalyptic redemption for Muslims and that they are 
usurpers of one of Islam’s holiest shrines—combine to form a potentially intoxicating 
cocktail for Islamic extremists, particularly in Palestine. These teachings have been 
espoused by recognized Islamic religious authorities and then applied in waking life to 
the extremists’ approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
2. Extremist Leaders 
a. Hasan al-Banna 
Born in Egypt in 1906 to an Islamic teacher, Hasan al-Banna received 
only the most elementary Islamic education.  Though he studied in secular schools to 
become a teacher in Egypt’s national school system, he undertook on his own to deepen 
his understanding of Islam.  Through the course of his personal studies and the 
experiences of his early teaching career, he became convinced that “the West was 
engaged in a new crusade to destroy Islam by means of social corruption and 
unbelief.”234  As al-Banna observed, this blatantly obvious crusade in 1920s Egypt 
(under British authority at the time) “founded schools and scientific and cultural institutes 
in the very heart of the Islamic domain, which cast doubt and heresy into the souls of its 
sons and taught them how to…disparage their religion…[and] divest themselves of their 
traditions and beliefs.”235 
Al-Banna came to the point, frustrated with the benign impotence of the 
extant Islamic organizations to counter this crusade in Egypt, where he founded the 
Muslim Brotherhood to begin setting things right.  The activities of the MB were 
proactive and all-encompassing—bringing politics, social programs, education and 
business under the umbrella of Islam.  The MB also dictated the practice of Islam for its 
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followers, emphasizing prayer, meditation and daily readings of the Qur’an as mandatory 
daily rituals.  Under the leadership of the layman al-Banna, MB leadership was likewise 
the domain of the laity versus the traditional Islamic scholars.236 
Hasan al-Banna is the first personality quoted in the opening of the Hamas 
charter immediately following an introductory passage from the Qur’an.  He is quoted as 
saying:  “Israel will be established and will stay established until Islam nullifies it as it 
nullified what was before it.”237  One key element of al-Banna’s MB doctrine that is 
employed by groups like Hamas against Israel states that “if you rise against us or stand 
in the path of our message, then we are permitted by God to defend ourselves against 
your injustice.”238  Al-Banna’s vision for Islamic society went beyond that of Islamic 
modernists like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani or Muhammad ‘Abduh;  the MB founder argued 
that the brotherhood of Islam “should unite to strengthen the Islamic world and to re-
establish the principles and the practices of Islam in its purest form…against ‘the 
encroachments of materialism.’”239  Al-Banna himself was not a particular advocate of 
militancy and violence, preferring instead an emphasis on a more benign program of 
information and missionary work.240  He was even referred to (and emulated) as a 
“pragmatist” for his willingness to enter the non-Islamic political forum on an Islamic 
platform.241  Nevertheless, al-Banna was also prepared to enter the fray of violence;  the 
MB under his leadership developed “its own armed force.”242  Al-Banna was murdered 
in 1949, likely to avenge the murder of the Egyptian prime minister the previous year by 
a member of the MB.243 
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b. Sayyid Qutb 
This Egyptian sage of the MB is a hero to Islamic extremists for 
withstanding the harshest years of repression from the Egyptian state.244  He came to the 
fore in Egypt after the murder of al-Banna and during the wave of purges against Islamic 
extremists implemented by Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s.  Although he was initially a 
follower of secular nationalism in Egypt, he experienced a change of heart “that of an 
Islamic da’iyah (missionary or summoner).”245  Part of Qutb’s journey toward extremist 
Islam was the result of a two-year educational stint in the United States, where he was 
dismayed by how the country was “materialistic and lacking in spiritual values and was 
disturbed by the popular and media support…for the nascent state of Israel.”246 
Sayyid Qutb was deeply committed, to the point of defending it with 
violence, to the sovereignty of Allah over all other authorities, and he maligned all, 
including his fellow Muslims, whose allegiance was to anyone or anything else.247  Shaul 
Mishal and Avraham Sela wrote of him that:  “violent Islam has been identified primarily 
with Sayyid Qutb’s militant doctrine, which viewed non-Islamic rule as Jahiliyya (the 
pre-Islamic era, portrayed by Muslims as a period of ignorance and darkness).”248  John 
Voll developed this idea further, quoting Qutb’s writings:  “jahiliyya…takes the form of 
claiming the right to create values, to legislate rules of collective behavior, and to choose 
any way of life that rests with men, without regard to what God has prescribed.”249  In 
this way, Qutb’s position on Jahiliyya was similar to that of Maulana Mawdudi, although 
Qutb believe in tackling it with violence.250  Needless to say, his teachings continued to 
create problems for the Egyptian government well after his death.251 
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With respect to the question of the Jews (and thereby of Israel), Qutb went 
to the ancient source on the subject, the Qur’an.  He reified the scriptural arguments 
against them from the time of the Prophet—since “the only divine truth left to mankind 
was Islam, all the others, including Judaism…were repositories of distortion and 
falsehood, not reflections of divine revelations.”252  Qutb taught that the Jews were out to 
destroy Islam and divert Muslims from the true path, and “transmitted a message of 
eternal enmity between Jews and Islam… [It was] a war that ‘[had] not been 
extinguished…its blaze [continued] raging in all corners of the world.’”253  In his 
parlance, the Jews had been up to the same intrigues against Islam since its inception, this 
was endemic to their nature, and Palestinian Muslims could only defeat them (and Israel) 
under the banner of a purified Islam.254  Like al-Banna before him, Qutb believed that the 
West was out “to conquer and destroy Islam,” and chief among his proofs behind this 
theory was British and American “promoting [of] Jewish emigration to Palestine.”255   
c. Sheikh Ahmad Yassin 
Sheikh Yassin, who started Hamas as an offshoot of the Palestinian MB, 
was a religious scholar and teacher in the Gaza Strip.256  He was the leader of the MB 
who helped author a key document in December 1987 “that call for the intensification of 
[the First Intifada].”257  The Israelis finally arrested Sheikh Yassin in September 1989 as 
part of a crackdown on Islamic militants in the OT—a cadre of people that, using the 
chain of mosques and religious institutions which the Israelis had previously supported, 
was growing into a major threat to Israel.258  The sheikh, who was nearly blind and 
severely disabled owing to an accident in his youth, was incarcerated until 1997, freed 
only as a bargaining chip to secure the release of two Mossad agents arrested in Jordan 
for an assassination attempt on Khaled Meshaal, at the time a minor member of the 
Hamas leadership.  Israeli historian Avi Shlaim credits Yassin’s release by the Israeli 
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government of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu as a critical factor in raising Hamas’ 
stocks in the late 1990s, making it next to impossible for the Palestinian Authority (PA) 
to clamp down on their violent activities.259 
Yassin’s original claim to fame was the fact that he was arrested in 
Nasser’s 1965 crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (which was also 
operating in the Gaza Strip at the time)—a purge that included the martyrdom of one of 
the brotherhood’s effluent voices, Sayyid Qutb.260  Sheikh Yassin was assassinated on 
March 22, 2004, by an Israeli air strike as he departed from early morning prayers at a 
Gaza City mosque, an act that elicited rage and massive demonstrations among 
Palestinians.261 
d. Fathi al-Shiqaqi 
Al-Shiqaqi, a doctor, and his contemporaries came from an anti-regime 
faction in Egypt known as the “Islamic Liberation Party,”262 and was “the military leader 
of Islamic Jihad.”263 Al-Shiqaqi and his associate, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-‘Auda, were 
proponents of an ecumenical movement calling all sects of Islam—Sunni, Shi’a, et 
cetera—to unite in Jihad against Israel.  The doctor was a leader among Palestinian 
students at the University of Zagazig in Egypt.  He was the published author of a short 
work espousing a Palestinian uprising after the fashion of the Islamic Revolution in Iran 
under Ayatollah Khomeini.  According to Gilles Kepel, al-Shiqaqi saw the Iranian 
example as an indication of the potential of Jihad to overcome the “the [Muslim] 
Brothers’ ‘quiescence’ and the PLO’s ‘impiety.’”264  Al-Shiqaqi was among the first of 
those in the Muslim Brotherhood tradition to advocate abandoning a peaceful, defensive 
stance in favor of open, armed conflict with the Israelis.  Their detractors in the 
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Palestinian Islamic community felt that actions of this nature were premature if they 
came before an Islamic state had actually been declared in Palestine.265 
Al-Shiqaqi was assassinated by the Israelis on the island of Malta on 
October 26, 1995, allegedly for his involvement in supporting suicide bombings in 
Israel.266 
D. CONCLUSION 
Palestinian Islamic extremists have a formidable arsenal of religious diktat 
supporting them in their opposition to the state of Israel, and to Jews in general.  
According to the Qur’an, Jews are the enemies of Islam, having abrogated the revelations 
of Allah, rejected his Prophet and threatened the Islamic faith and its holiest places.  
These scriptural teachings have not gone unnoticed by the religious extremist leaders 
looking for fodder to mobilize Palestinians against Israel.  Religious convictions first 
espoused by the MB in Egypt, evoked by Islamic extremist luminaries like Hasan al-
Banna and Sayyid Qutb were easily adopted and applied to present circumstances by the 
early leaders of Palestinian Islamic extremism such as Sheikh Yassin and Fathi al-
Shiqaqi.  These men, as will be seen next, founded groups that took the doctrines to a 
new level in perpetuating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
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V. ISLAMIC EXTREMIST GROUPS:  FOUNDATIONS, GROUP 
PROFILES & ACTIVITIES SINCE OSLO I 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The strong personalities mentioned in the previous section helped to put flesh on 
the anti-Jewish sentiments contained in the Islamic scriptures, effectively marrying them 
to the intolerant position in which the Palestinians found themselves with respect to the 
state of Israel.  These men were provided a mixture of historical examples and real-world 
leadership for the Islamic extremist organizations that emerged in the Occupied 
Territories during the 1980s, and waxed in the violence of their operations against Israelis 
throughout the 1990s and well into the first decade of the new century.  However, these 
groups did not only attack the Israelis, they also functioned as a religious counter-weight 
to the morally discredited and inept Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the group 
that came to politically dominate the Palestinian Authority (PA) from the early 1990s up 
until the 2006 elections.  In describing these Islamic extremist groups rose in opposition 
to the PLO, Raphael Israeli wrote that while the PLO co-opted Islam for self-serving 
purposes, the extremists lent “primacy to Islam over nationalistic and other 
considerations…[and were] more prepared than others to take risks in the fulfillment of 
those lofty goals.”267 
Using the banner of Islam as a standard for the Palestinian struggle with the state 
of Israel, these Islamic extremist groups, Hamas in particular, have taken the level of 
violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to astronomical levels, especially since the start 
of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000.  The collection actions of these groups have gone a long 
way in raising insurmountable barriers to peace, preoccupying the Israeli government 
with a virtual state of war and committing act after act of violence that could only 
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B. HARIKET UL-MUQAWWAMAT UL-ISLAMIYYA (ISLAMIC 
RESISTANCE MOVEMENT – HAMAS) 
Propaganda attributed to Hamas started hitting the streets at the end of 1987, but 
it did not assume its name and formally declare itself until January 1988.268  Though 
Hamas is known today for the violent actions of its most militant wing, the ‘Izz el-Din al-
Qassam Brigades, it began as a relatively above-board offshoot of the aforementioned 
Palestinian arm of the MB.269 
As the Israelis supported the MB in earlier days, they also gave Hamas leeway in 
the 1980s because of its opposition to the secular PLO270—it was a classic situation of 
“the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”  Of course, in order to acquire legal sanction 
from the Israeli government to operate, Hamas was “obliged to pledge that its fight for 
Palestinian rights would be conducted within the limits of the law and without the use of 
arms.”271  Hamas also benefited from the presence of its elder, the PIJ, which acted as a 
lightening rod for Israeli reprisals during the First Intifada of the late 1980s.  Historian 
Charles Smith explained that because of this, Hamas was essentially able to sneak in 
under the radar and establish itself as the modern expression of MB ideals. 
As mentioned previously, one of the earliest Hamas notables from the MB cadre 
was Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, whose leadership of Hamas led to his assassination by the 
Israelis in 2004.  In the ilk of its forebear, the MB, Hamas and its founders wished to 
“[create] a Palestinian state, founded on religious principles, in all of former 
Palestine.”272  In light of principle aims like this, it may be difficult to conceive that the 
Israelis wanted to support (even under the table) a Palestinian movement of this kind.  Of 
course, since both PIJ and Hamas were nascent organizations in the 1980s, the Israelis 
                                                 
268 Encyclopedia of World Terrorism, Vol 2, eds. Martha Crenshaw and John Pimlott (Armonk, NY: 
Sharpe Reference, 1997), 348. 
269 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, April 2004), 120. 
270 Glenn E. Robinson, “The Logic of Palestinian State-Building after Oslo,” in Building a Palestinian 
State: The Incomplete Revolution (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), 189;  Shlaim, The Iron 
Wall, 459. 
271 Shlaim, 459. 
272 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 5th ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 2004), 
410. 
69 
felt they would benefit by encouraging the Palestinians to splinter along as many lines as 
possible, thereby postponing confrontation with a unified Palestinian entity. 
The MB branch that formed the basis for Hamas began at the Islamic University 
of Gaza, and according to Ahmad Moussalli, “continuously clashed with the secular 
forces of the [PLO].”273  Moussalli went on to explain that the MB, until the outbreak of 
the First Intifada in 1987, had only sought socio-economic improvements in the OT, and 
had distanced itself from politics.  However, he postulated that the Intifada was the 
magnet that drew the MB into the arena of armed conflict with Israel that they had 
previously avoided.  Hamas was not simply a militant organization.  It first won the 
support of the Palestinian populace through its socio-economic schemes.  These schemes, 
which originated in the Gaza Strip under the MB auspices, included funneling Zakat 
(Islamic charity or alms-giving) to the poor of that region.  This won the forbears of 
Hamas a great deal of clout and influence.274  As a result, Hamas’ move into the militant 
realm at a time of popular uprising only brought the organization further acclaim with its 
people.275 
Unlike the PLO, Hamas was (and is) opposed to any kind of settlement with the 
Israelis.  In addition to being embedded in Palestinian society, opposition to Israel was 
one of the organization’s key calling cards, and raises difficulties to the present day for 
any involvement by the group in peace negotiations.276  A virtual clone of its elder 
brother movement, the PIJ, Hamas’ position at its core was that “the state of Israel should 
not exist.”277  What this meant for Hamas from the beginning was that all the land of 
Palestine prior to the declaration of the state of Israel should constitute a Palestinian Arab 
Islamic state.  As expressed in the Hamas charter, “Palestine is an Islamic land, ‘an 
Islamic waqf throughout the generations until the Day of Resurrection.’”278  This of 
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course places Hamas on the opposite pole from the Zionists (religious and secular) who 
sought the entirety of Biblical Israel, or Eretz Israel, for a solely Jewish state.  It also put 
Hamas at loggerheads with the reality on the ground, as well as with Fatah, which 
declared, as part of the Oslo peace process, that it was prepared to accept less than all of 
Palestine.  For Fatah to countenance such an idea was akin to blasphemy.279  A brief look 
at Article 27 of the Hamas Charter (written in 1988) shows that the organization tried to 
hold out a hand to the PLO, recalling the brotherly affinity of all Muslims, but in the end 
made this statement contingent upon the PLO embracing Islam as the foundation for a 
Palestinian state.280  So, Hamas’ religiously-based ideology places it in the very tedious 
position between “adherence to the Islamic vision of holy war (Jihad) against Israel…and 
its awareness of the necessity of reckoning with political considerations.”281 
Another defining aspect of Hamas was the way in which it diverged from its MB 
roots.  As has already been stated, Hamas was first and foremost a departure from the 
MB’s predominantly peaceable efforts.  However, as Mark Tessler puts it, within the 
Palestinian community itself, it distinguished itself by not pandering to the traditional and 
established elites—a common MB modus operandi—rather, it “sought recruits among the 
younger and better-educated individuals without ties to the Palestinian establishment.”282 
The U.S. State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 lists the 
worldwide Palestinian community as the principle financial backer of Hamas.283  
However, in its infancy, the movement was financed by Saudi Arabia and other oil-
producing states of the region, including Iran.284  So, like any powerful organization, 
Hamas is well-bankrolled. 
Replete with the backing of the Palestinian milieu by right of its social services 
and the moral authority of Islam, and financed by the deep pockets of the Gulf States, 
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Hamas could boldly issue leaflets in January of 1988 with Qur’anic recitations such as 
the one reproduced by Charles Smith, which read (in part): 
The infidels ‘will not cease from fighting against you till they have made 
you renegades from religion, if they can.  And whoso becometh a 
renegade and dieth in his disbelief such are they whose works have fallen 
both in the world and in the Hereafter.  Such are the rightful owners of the 
fire:  they will abide therein.’285 
Armed in this way, they are a potent force, not only among the Palestinian 
residents of the Occupied Territories and many in Diaspora, but also in the wider Islamic 
world. 
Raphael Israeli indicated that when the Hamas charter was written in 1988, it 
“[seemed] to articulate a growing sentiment that Islam [was] the panacea for all the ills of 
Palestine.”286  The charter contains a myriad of Islamic scriptural references to back up 
the group’s various claims.287  The opening statement of the charter is taken from Sura 3 
of the Qur’an—a passage comparing Jews as Ahl al-Kitab (“People of the Book”—a 
category that encompasses Christians as well) with Muslims.  This scripture elevates 
Muslims as “the best nation that hath been raised up,” and vilifies Jews as “smitten with 
vileness wheresoever they are found,” and subjected to “indignation from Allah” because 
they fail to accept Islam.288 
In the introduction to the charter, Hamas calls upon the Palestinian people to be 
prepared for a “very long and dangerous” battle with the Jews requiring “the dedication 
of all of us…[through] successive phases, a battalion that must be supported by battalion 
after battalion of the divided Arab and Islamic world until the enemy is vanquished and 
the victory of Allah is sure.”289 
Hamas defines itself in its charter as a movement based upon Islam, and governed 
by it in all aspects of ideology and practice.  It claims historical connection to the 
“Righteous Ancestors,” (al-Salaf al-Salih) living thus with “Allah as its goal, the Prophet 
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as its model, and the Qur’an is its constitution.”290  In such lofty pursuits, “death for the 
sake of Allah is [the movement’s] most coveted desire.”291 
Hamas’ charter contains the same Hadith quoted by ‘Usama bin Laden in his 
1998 television interview.  Hamas uses this Hadith to encourage the Faithful not to flag 
in their efforts until the final goal is attainted in “The Last Hour.”292  In Hamas parlance, 
the Jihad of Palestinian nationalism against “the enemy…when he sets foot on the land of 
the Muslims” is considered a religious obligation levied upon “every Muslim man and 
woman.”293  In light of this, the Hamas charter categorically rejects “[peace] initiatives, 
the so-called peaceful solutions, and international conferences” undertaken on behalf of 
the Palestinians.294  These same are seen merely as “a means of enforcing the rule of 
unbelievers [non-Muslims] in the land of the Muslims.”295  As evidence of this, the 
charter recalls the passage in Sura 2 of the Qur’an which advises Muslims that “the Jews 
will never be pleased with thee…until thou follow their religion,” and warns them that 
they stand in peril of Allah’s wrath if they do so.296 
With respect to the sanctity of the land, the historical paraphrase of Hamas 
confirms that the desire of the enemies of Islam was to discredit Islam as a religion before 
consummating the goal of the Crusades through the physical occupation of Palestine.  
According to Hamas, Palestine is holy to Muslims because Jerusalem is its center, the 
original city which Muslims were to face during their five daily prayers, and because 
Jerusalem contains Al-Aqsa Mosque, forever sanctified because of the Prophet’s visit 
there.  The charter also quotes a Hadith of Muhammad to the effect that one day “’Allah 
is going to conquer Syria for you…from al-‘Arish to the Euphrates,’” territory that would 
include Palestine.297 
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The charter beckons to the Arab and Islamic peoples to join Hamas’ war against 
Zionism, warning that the Jews’ ultimate goal is subjugation of lands even beyond those 
between the Nile and the Euphrates Rivers.  It goes on at some length about the global 
conspiracy of Zionists to isolate the Palestinians from the rest of their Arab and Islamic 
neighbors.  Hamas enjoins these neighbors against committing such a “high treason” and 
incurring a “curse” upon themselves on the authority of Sura 8, which warns that the one 
who abandons the Faithful in the midst of the fight will suffer “the indignation of Allah, 
and his abode shall be hell.”298  Hamas sees itself as one with its fellow anti-Zionist 
Islamic movements and as partners, to a limited extent, with non-Islamic Palestinian 
nationalist movements such as the PLO.  The PLO, while serving a worthy purpose, will 
only truly be one with Hamas when it “has adopted Islam as its system of life.”299 
Hamas put its religious doctrines into violent action 533 times against Israelis 
between September 13, 1993 and December 31, 2005, and has thus been far and away the 
most active and violent of the Palestinian Islamic extremist groups over the period.300  
The group drew the first blood of the post-Oslo I era in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
stabbing an Israeli farmer to death near Tel Aviv 11 days after the peace agreement was 
signed.301  Since that time, Hamas has been the progenitor of more religiously motivated 
acts of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than any other religious extremist 
group.  There are really two consecutive epochs of violence in the 12-year period since 
Oslo I—the pre-Al-Aqsa Intifada period (September 13, 1993 – September 28, 2000), and 
the post-Al-Aqsa era (September 29, 2000 to the present)—in both eras, Hamas has 
played the principal role.  Hamas was responsible for 31 acts of violence in the pre-Al-
Aqsa period compared with a total of 13 incidents attributed to all other religious Zionist 
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and Palestinian Islamic groups combined during the same time-frame.302  It is worth 
mentioning that even in 1999, a year otherwise entirely devoid of violence claimed by or 
ascribed to religious extremists, Hamas was the sole group to raise its head, attempting to 
assassinate two Israeli settlers driving home to their home in a small Jewish settlement in 
an otherwise Palestinian neighborhood in Hebron.303  The post Al-Aqsa era saw Hamas 
raise their operations tempo to unseen levels.  Beginning with 20 reported operations in 
2001,304 Hamas accelerated their involvement in violence exponentially over the next 
two years.  By 2004, the annual number of violent Hamas incidents reached triple digits;  
206 operations were carried out that year.305  Even in 2005, where the group participated 
in the hudna (“truce”) during the run-up to the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, 
Hamas was still responsible for 183 incidents over the first 10 months of the year.306  It is 
difficult to say how the organization will choose to express its religiously-motivated 
opposition to the Jewish state now that it has won an overwhelming popular mandate—
74 out of 132 parliamentary seats with 75% of over 1.3 million registered voters 
participating—to form the next government for the Palestinians.307  Though at least a 
portion of the group has entered the formal political process, up to the present, Hamas 
political leadership has insisted it retains the right to violent resistance while, as one of its 
spokesmen phrased it, Israeli “’occupation and aggression continues.’”308 
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1. ‘Izz el-Din al-Qassam Brigades 
This sub-group of Hamas is named after the venerated martyr of the same name 
from 1930s Palestinian Islamic militant history.  It is generally known as Hamas’ militant 
wing, having operated under the political top-cover of the larger group since at least the 
mid-1990s.309  They “have conducted many attacks—including large-scale suicide 
bombings—against Israeli civilian and military targets.”310 
The group’s first recorded act of violence, which occurred on August 27, 1994, 
was the stabbing to death of two Israelis in the village of Ramle commemorating the six 
month anniversary and avenging the massacre of Muslim worshippers at the Ibrahimi 
Mosque in Hebron at the hands of  Baruch Goldstein, a religious Zionist extremist.311  
Since that time, the ‘Izz el-Din al-Qassam Brigades have participated in 94 of Hamas’ 
aforementioned 533 violent operations.  Only six of these were recorded prior to the 
outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, with the remaining 88 occurring during from 2001 on:  
8 in 2001;  28 in 2002;  40 in 2003;  and 12 in 2004.  ‘Izz el-Din al-Qassam was quiet in 
2005.312 
C. HARIKET AL-JIHAD AL-ISLAMI FI FILASTIN (PALESTINIAN 
ISLAMIC JIHAD – PIJ) 
According to the Encyclopedia of Terrorism, the PIJ (not to be confused with the 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad which assassinated Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in 
1981)313 was started in the Gaza Strip at the end of the 1970s by Fathi al-Shiqaqi and 
‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-‘Auda.  The PIJ was an entirely secret organization until the mid-1980s 
“whose members were said to include men recruited while in Israeli prisons.”314  Before 
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the early days of the First Intifada in 1987-88, the PIJ was considered to be composed in 
very small cells whose numbers in sum were negligible.315   
Like Hamas, this Muslim Brotherhood-founded organization took inspiration 
from ‘Izz el-Din al-Qassam, the first widely acknowledged Islamic martyr of armed 
conflict with the state of Israel.316  However, unlike Hamas, the PIJ was not an 
organization that enjoyed a broad base of grass-roots support among garden-variety 
Palestinians.  In fact, absent Hamas’ network of social services, it was and remains 
difficult to pin down exactly who or what comprises the PIJ.317  Whatever the case, the 
PIJ was a pioneer of Islamic extremism in the Palestinian community.  They were the 
first to effectively exploit Islam as a means of whipping-up the populous, and drew praise 
even from secular elements in Palestinian society for their efforts and successes in this.318 
The PIJ, in its early days maintained a working relationship with Yasser ‘Arafat 
and Fatah, the political faction of the PLO, even cooperating with the Unified National 
Leadership (UNL) of Palestine—a PLO-endorsed institution—at the beginning of the 
First Intifada.  This initial working relationship fizzled, however, when PIJ learned that 
‘Arafat had plans to cave-in to the Israelis and the West and approve a two-state solution 
for the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Of course, a critical point to recall about the PLO is that 
Israel’s forcible ejection of the group from Lebanon in 1982 had rendered it militarily and 
politically bankrupt.319  The PIJ, by contrast, had made a name for itself by being the first 
to lock horns with the Israelis before the First Intifada, and then by continuing this 
practice after the Intifada had begun.320 
There is also a bit of rivalry between the PIJ and Hamas.  The PIJ regards itself as 
the Islamic organization that had spearheaded armed confrontation with the Israelis, 
while Hamas is seen as a relative newcomer to that struggle.321  This rivalry, however, 
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does not approach the divide separating both religious groups from the secular PLO.  
John L. Esposito listed the PIJ as an organization not only opposed to political Zionism, 
but also as one that viewed “the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as the most recent iteration of 
an age-old struggle between Islam and Judaism, dating back to the Jews’ rejection of [the 
Prophet] Muhammad.”322  The PIJ drew strength from the example of the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979 in its crusade to eliminate “all Western influence from the entire 
Muslim world.”323 
The earliest attribution of violence against Israelis by members of the PIJ came in 
October of 1987 in the Gaza Strip, when it killed an Israeli officer and four Palestinians;  
an event that sparked riots at the university there.324  Strangely, this level of acrimony 
was not necessarily reciprocated by the Israelis until the very end of the 1980s.  Israel did 
not formally denounce the PIJ as a terrorist organization until mid-1989, and waited 
another entire year before mounting aggressive operations to round up PIJ militants in the 
Occupied Territories.325 
In the present day, though the organization still exists and carries out operations in 
Israel and the Occupied Territories, the U.S. State Department’s Patterns of Global 
Terrorism 2003 listed the strength of the PIJ as “unknown.”326  The organization is 
known to receive money from the Iranians, and until recently, had offices in Syria327—
offices that Syria has claimed in the press are now closed. 
The PIJ, unlike its counterpart Hamas, is an organization with secretive origins 
and a lack of deep roots in modern-day Palestinian society.  It is less integrated into 
ordinary Palestinian life than Hamas, and lacks Fatah’s political ties (however weak 
those may be) with the West and the Israeli government.  It’s sole commitment is to the 
“violent destruction of Israel…[as part of] a larger worldwide holy war, pitting Islam 
against all non-believers. PIJ has thus violently opposed the peace process and has 
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actively used suicide bombings against Israeli targets to derail the process.”328  This 
unrelenting opposition to the existence of Israel has kept the PIJ out of the Palestinian 
electoral process and the hudna which has accompanied it.  For the PIJ, any association 
with Israel with respect to politics or peace is polluted and thus unacceptable.329 
Within this campaign of violent opposition, the first operation undertaken by the 
PIJ after the September signing of the Oslo I accord did not take place until December 
5th, and was the sole act of violence claimed by the group during the final three-and-a-
half months of 1993.  The shooting on an Israeli public bus resulted in the death of two 
Israelis as well as the PIJ operative.330  Throughout the remainder of the 1990s, the PIJ 
were relatively quiet, the bulk (103) of their 109 total operations against Israelis since 
September 13, 1993 transpiring since Ariel Sharon’s September 2000 visit to the Haram 
al-Sharif.331  2005 was the PIJ’s most active year to-date.  It was responsible for 54 
incidents in the period.332   
The PIJ refused to join the hudna preceding the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary 
elections, remaining dedicated to the annihilation of the state of Israel and carrying on 
with operations to that end up to the present.333  The PIJ committed five acts of violence 
in Israel in January, 2006, continuing the pursuit of its Islamic extremist agenda against 
the state of Israel despite the decisive political majority attained by its brother 
organization, Hamas, in parliamentary elections a few weeks earlier.334 
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1. Saraya al-Quds (Jerusalem Squads or Brigades) 
Though it maintains separate titular political and armed divisions, PIJ does not 
differentiate practically between itself and its militant wing, Saraya al-Quds.  The first 
act of violence attributed to Saraya al-Quds, pulled off in 2002 in cooperation with its 
parent organization, was also the only operation in which the TKB differentiated the 
Jerusalem Squads from the PIJ.  The operation was a suicide bombing at the Arim open 
air market in the city of Kfar Sava which led to the deaths of three people (including the 
bomber) and the injury of 69 others.335  With the exception of this sole incident, 
operations of the Jerusalem Squads have been referred to under the auspices of the PIJ. 
D. LIJAN AL-MUQAWWAMAT ASH-SHA’ABIYYA (POPULAR 
RESISTANCE COMMITTEES) 
The Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) were founded late in the year 2000, in 
the wake of Ariel Sharon’s provocative September 28 visit to the Haram al-Sharif, by 
Jamal Abu Samhadana, who was previously a member of the Palestinian secular 
nationalist organizations, Fatah and the Tanzim.  It is named in the TKB as a religious 
organization, although its membership draws from both religious and secular Palestinian 
militant groups.  The group, allegedly inspired by Lebanese Hizb’allah, typically operates 
from the Gaza Strip, launching rockets into Israeli territory.  The Salah al-Din Battalions 
(a.k.a., Salah al-Din Brigades) are the PRC’s nominal armed branch, though there is no 
real structural separation between the two groups and the TKB characterizes the entire 
organization as not having “any focus beyond armed terrorism.”336 
The PRC/Salah al-Din Battalions’ first recorded act of violence occurred on 
November 13, 2000, a month-and-a-half after Ariel Sharon entered the Haram al-Sharif.  
Gunmen belonging to the group fired on a bus and an automobile on a road north of the 
West Bank settlement of Ofra, killing three Israelis and wounding eight others.337  This 
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was the only operation attributed to the organizations until 2004, when they perpetrated 
five violent incidents.  Like the PIJ, 2005 was also the PRC/Salah al-Din Battalions 
busiest year;  they instigated 22 acts of violence against Israel that year.  The groups have 
likewise not adhered to the hudna, with both the PRC (on December 28, 2005)338 and the 
Salah al-Din Battalions (February 8, 2006)339 being responsible for rocket attacks on 
Israeli territory. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Palestinian Islamic extremist organizations such as Hamas, the PIJ and the PRC 
have, in addition to perpetrating hundreds of violent operations against Israel and its 
citizens since September 1993, managed to win the support of substantial elements of the 
Palestinian demographic, as evidenced by the political success of Hamas in the recent 
parliamentary elections.  These groups by their vehement, uncompromising opposition to 
the state of Israel and refusal to negotiate with it are acting out the fundamental principles 
of the religious doctrines laid out for them in the Qur’an and given voice by their Islamic 
extremist leaders.  As yet another year of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict slowly grinds by, 
the principal Palestinian Islamic extremist group, Hamas, continues in spite of its 
political ascendancy to retain its religiously-motivated hostility toward Israel and its 
intractable unwillingness to participate in the peace process.  What is of equal concern is 
that Hamas’ sibling extremist groups, the PIJ and the PRC, have not only refused on 
principle to allow for the possibility of peace with Israel, but have also declined to join 
the Palestinian political process.  Both organizations likewise have continued to carry out 
violent operations against Israel, abjuring the hudna joined by Hamas in advance of the 
elections.  Collectively, these organizations represent the alter ego of the religious Zionist 
extremists on the Israeli side, rejecting on their own religious grounds repeated calls for 
an end to militant activities and any hope for a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
As has been shown, the scriptures of Judaism and Islam provide ample, and 
opposing, cause for extremists of both faiths to take an implacable stand against any 
notion of an equitable peace between Israel and the Palestinians.  The Jewish scriptures 
teach religious Zionists that they are God’s chosen people, and that as a result there are 
certain indisputable realities regarding their position before the Almighty as well as on 
earth.  The first of these is that they must redeem all of the land of Israel as promised to 
Abraham (from the Nile to the Euphrates).  Second, they have an obligation, not fulfilled 
in almost 2,000 years, to worship God according to His ordinances in a Temple—which 
they believe must be on its former site in Jerusalem, where the Muslims’ Haram al-Sharif 
currently stands.  Finally, the messiah is coming with a millennial kingdom in tow, a fact 
which lays the onus on Jews to act decisively to bring the redemption of the land and the 
Temple about.  Running through all of this is the thought that the Arabs themselves do 
not really matter—in the larger scheme, they are just another adversary trying to stand 
between the Jewish people and their divinely-appointed destiny. 
Specific, influential Jewish rabbis have not only subscribed to these doctrines, but 
have given them new life, reinterpreting and teaching them to consecutive generations of 
religious Zionists.  These rabbis, men like the Rabbis Kook, Meir Kahane and his son, 
Binyamin, though they are all now deceased, have laid the framework beneath a bedrock 
of religious Zionist organizations which are active to the present establishing, expanding 
and defending, even against the Israeli government, their settlements on land that Israeli 
moderates are trying to give the Palestinians in exchange for peace.  Certain extremist 
elements among their followers have perpetrated violence against Palestinians and Jews 
alike with the expressed purpose of disrupting, halting or reversing negotiations to 
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
In the Islamic corner, one can observe a damning case constructed against Jews in 
the Qur’an.  The scriptural characterization of Jews as an apostate people that abandoned, 
changed, or ignored the dictates of Allah at their own whim, rejected his Prophet 
(Muhammad), and thus are hell-bound, has potential to persuade even a moderate Muslim 
82 
to be skeptical toward Jews.  Added to the mixture, however, is the scriptural warning 
that Jews also seek to pry Muslims away from the true faith and the real world 
exclamation point of Israeli encirclement of the Haram al-Sharif.  These doctrines might 
not be so ominous if they were left in the pages of history.  However, a succession of 
religious extremist leaders—including the likes of al-Banna, Qutb and Yassin—has 
arisen over the last several decades to issue an Islamic call to the Umma, one to which 
many Palestinian Muslims have responded, to rise up against the Israeli affront to the 
expressed will and word of Allah.  These founding leaders of the Palestinian Islamic 
extremist organizations (and their predecessor groups such as the MB) have breathed life 
into the scriptural texts.  They have applied the ancient criticisms of scripture to the 
modern day Jews and to the state of Israel, teaching their followers that Israel is a blight 
on the house of Islam that must be destroyed.  Israel should be replaced, they have said, 
with a Palestinian Islamic state.  The greatest danger has been that they have spawned 
groups of Palestinian Islamic extremists that are sold out to these very scripturally based 
causes. 
Why does all of this matter?  In spite of the fact that religious extremists may not 
represent the mainstream within the Jewish and Islamic faiths, they nonetheless have 
unintentionally conspired to create an atmosphere of violent intolerance for inter-faith 
and inter-community peace between Israelis and Palestinians.  The real “so what?” lies in 
the fact that these Jewish and Islamic extremists have not sat back to allow a political 
process to work.  They have been very active—more so even since the first attempted 
Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement in 1993—doing the exact things at all the right points 
in time, whether it be building settlements or murdering innocent civilians, that have 
stymied peace efforts.  The stakes for these religious extremists are eternal, and thus their 
time horizons extend to infinity—far beyond the furthest limit of any democratically 
elected Israeli, Palestinian or Western regime, and thus further into the future than the 
continuity of political good-will can ever hope to reach. 
Israeli and Palestinian moderates, as well as the United States and its allies in the 
international community therefore find themselves in a very difficult situation facing the 
religious extremisms in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  It is one of the few situations of 
its kind in the world, if not the only one, where the canonical scriptures of two competing 
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faiths enjoin their members to stop at nothing in their fight over the same piece of real 
estate.  It is a condition of enmity that dates back to the inceptions of Judaism and of 
Islam.  Unless those parties favoring peace can learn to re-write scripture and force 
believers to accept the change, or can find a way to get inside people’s minds and change 
not just what they believe about God, but also their entire framework of thought and 
action based upon that belief, then prospects are not good for achieving Israelis and 
Palestinians living side-by-side in “peace and security” as expressed in our National 
Security Strategy (NSS).340 
The issue of religious extremism both in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and in 
general poses challenges to American policymakers and analysts, which have 
traditionally had difficulty contending with the issue.  These individuals have displayed a 
propensity to address the matter of religion from a uniquely American perspective, 
utilizing a sort of “mirror-imaging.”  As Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt put it,  
Americans are more open to a belief in the basic similarity of people 
throughout the world, perhaps because of America’s experience in 
successfully absorbing and assimilating immigrants from diverse cultural 
and religious backgrounds.  Thus…[they] risk being more likely…to 
understand and predict the actions of others on the basis of what they 
would do under similar circumstances.341 
This analytical tendency on the part of policymakers in a religiously pluralistic, 
multi-ethnic society will fall short of the mark if applied to understanding and attempting 
to solve a conflict perpetuated, at least in part, by religious dogmatists with nothing to 
lose in this world and everything to gain in the next.  Looking to the symptomatic 
political, social, economic or military issues alone to understand and craft policies toward 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict leaves a gaping hole in the prescription, one filled by the 
elephant in the room:  religious extremism. 
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